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AL-SHODHANA

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EDITOR-IN - CHIEF

Dr Norbert Lobo

Associate Professor & Head

Department of Economics

St Aloysius College (Autonomous)

Mangaluru -575 003

Email: alshodhana@gmail.com

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Tel. : 0824 - 2449700 / 01, 2449703 Fax: 0824 -2449705

website: www.staloyusius.edu.in email: principal_sac@yahoo.com

Principal's Message

Optimum usage of learning resources in the field of higher education, those available in plenty especially on the web, is a challenge to the entire teaching fraternity. Chalk and talk method, dictation of notes from old yellowed pages, usage of "guides" etc do not enthuse and motivate students to love and learn a subject in depth. Those who have good memory seem to be excelling in the rank list and applauded for their achievement. This type of learning fails to make a student reflective, innovative and the contribution that one makes to the creation of new knowledge is almost zero.

The amount of information that is available on the internet is enormous. Given an option to attend classes without the restriction of compulsory attendance, large number of students would prefer to sit out of the class, read the dictated or photocopied notes and yet pass with distinction. The challenge to the teaching fraternity is to make use of modern technology in their teaching-learning process to ignite the minds of young scholars to be innovative, research oriented and contribute in the creation of new knowledge.

The general complaint in almost all institutions of higher learning is that the students fail to make use of library resources to the full extent. The number of students (and the staff) making use of the library is dwindling. The primary reason for this phenomenon, I must say, is the teaching-learning methodology employed by our teaching faculty. Why should any student visit a library when everything needed to obtain a distinction is spoon-fed in the class room? The spirit of creativity and innovation is nipped in its bud by the methodology employed in our teaching learning process.

Problem solving methods, creative assignments, small scale research projects relevant to the local situations, survey methods, data collection and drawing some conclusions on this collected data, micro teaching, Seminars, surprise tests, quiz, review, report writing etc are some of the ways through which students can exhibit their creativity and innovation and get into the depth of a topic. This will surely initiate a student to love the subject and get into a research mode in studies. To implement these methods effectively, the teacher himself/herself must be well versed in the usage of technology and innovative methods of teaching-learning.

I wish to congratulate and thank the editorial team of 'Al-Shodhana' for their efforts in bringing out this research journal in a creative manner.

Rev Fr Swebert D' Silva, SJ
Principal

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Editor's Note

Beginning with this issue *Al-shodhana* will be a journal exclusively for humanities and social sciences covering the disciplines of business studies, communication and media studies, humanities, management studies, and social sciences. I thank all the members of our editorial board and editorial advisory board from the field of biological sciences, computer science, physical sciences and technology for their active involvement in the initial nurturing of this journal. Henceforth we will not publish the articles from basic and applied sciences. However, keeping our basic objective in mind, this peer-reviewed multi-disciplinary refereed journal will continue to provide an opportunity for the young faculty members, research scholars and students to disseminate their research findings and views among a wider audience. Keeping our promise we are happy to present the sixth issue containing seven articles from the disciplines of humanities and social sciences.

In the article **Doing Gender: A Study of Nagamandala**, *Rego* taking the tale of Nagamandala tries to look at the myths and oral tales that are adapted and circulated over time to encapsulate those fantasies that are inaccessible in life otherwise. It also explores some of the underpinnings of gender that are discussed in the tale of Nagamandala. *Rajmohan and Shafwan* in their article **The Sword of Tipu Sultan: A Study on the Historical and Fictional Representations of Tipu Sultan** try to reveal the fictionality of history. Looking at Tipu Sultan from a different perspective, they argue that though all historical versions are true, there is nothing like the ultimate historical truth. *Sequeira* in his article **Politics of Collective Memory Hindutva Spatial Strategies and Assault on Syncretic Culture** argues that with the arrival of the Hindutva ideology and political movement in Indian politics, and with the pursuit of what are called 'spatial strategies', the syncretic culture of India has suffered a huge blow.

Salian in his paper **Institutions and Economic Change** makes an attempt to build an argument that the main determinants of differences in the development of nations and the well being of people across the world are due to differences in functioning and composition of political and economic institutions. Analysing the data available on India and South Korea he makes a case for reforming the

institutions to solve the problems of development. In his article **Resource Use Efficiency in Organic and Inorganic Paddy Production in Hilly Zone of Shimoga District of Karnataka: A Farm Level Analysis**, *Thippeswamy* tries to analyse the resource-use efficiency at farm level between organic and inorganic paddy production in the hilly zone of Shimoga district of Karnataka.

D'Souza in her paper **Cuban Response to the US Policy Postures** makes an attempt to give an account of the relations between these two countries especially after the disintegration of the USSR against the backdrop of present changing relations. The paper also revisits the dynamics of Cuba being a pariah state to the US in the phase of estrangement and the changes initiated for being the partner in the changing situation. *Douglas'* paper **Women's Political Underrepresentation: Focus on United States and India** is an attempt to analyse the need for political representation by assessing the status of under representation of women in the US and India. The author also analyses the reasons for such under representation in the political arena of the US and assesses the change and concerns of Indian political society as a large popular democracy of the world.

I thank all the authors for providing such a variety of research articles on a broad range of topics. My thanks are due to the Principal, members of the editorial board and the editorial advisory board. I am grateful to Dr Sylvia Rego and Dr Suresh Poojary for their whole-hearted support in editing this issue.

Dr Norbert Lobo
Editor-in-Chief

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ALL CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO:

Dr Norbert Lobo, The Editor - in- Chief, Al-Shodhana, St Aloysius College (Autonomous), Mangaluru - 575 003, Karnataka - India.

Email: alshodhana@gmail.com

Soft copy of the article may be submitted to: alshodhana@gmail.com

DOING GENDER: A STUDY OF NAGAMANDALA

- Sylvia Rego

Abstract

Any society endeavours to understand itself through narratives since its culture and lived experiences are embedded in and symbolised through them. Myths and oral tales therefore are of immense significance and are adapted and circulated over time to encapsulate those fantasies that are inaccessible in life otherwise. Nagamandala is one such tale that has been used in a play and a movie. The myth of the serpent taking on human form is a popular one and has been used in this tale. However, the transactions that take place when there is a change in genre and medium are interesting. Such tales while being inherently emancipatory simultaneously call for a structural and ideological patterning that is governed by dominant gender norms. This paper hopes to explore some of the underpinnings of gender that are negotiated in this tale.

Key words: *gender, performative, fantasy, masculinity, femininity, desire*

The myths, legends and folk-lore of every society are replete with simmering desires that are at times inchoate and yet articulate at others and which reveal the ways in which the Collective Unconscious of a society gets expression. As Moutoushi Chakravartee says, fantasy expresses 'instinctual human drives, irrespective of morality' (Chakravartee, 2006). The rigid and patriarchal expectations in heterosexual, monogamous, caste/class-based sexual unions are therefore by their very nature bound to engender countless sexual possibilities that fall outside their controlling purview.

However, there is often a tacit social connivance at a breach of faith in relationships so long as they do not in material or other significant ways puncture the overt social order. The Bhakti cult of erotic love for the divine and perfect lover while undermining the overarching authority of the husband, is still an acceptable avenue and fills the void of imperfection embodied in conjugality. Entering into a trance, moving about with a sense of abandon, taking on the mantle of the 'mad' and other such moves smudge the neat lines of normativity

*Dr Sylvia Rego, Associate Professor, Dept. of English, St. Aloysius College (Autonomous), Mangaluru- 575 003.
Email: sylrego@gmail.com*

and give access to pleasures that desiring bodies can lay new claim to. Myths and fantasies then contain exciting possibilities whereby the ideal lover not accessible otherwise becomes the new reality and feelings of inadequacy and guilt are glossed over in a psycho-social quest for the perfect union.

The domain of fantasy then gains in significance as an essential safety valve to contain and give expression to the infinite possibilities teeming within socially mandated ideals of sexuality. The realm of fantasy thus shows the deployment of several coping mechanisms that work to retain a semblance of sanctity around the legitimate, yet porous social arrangements even as the latter get challenged and subverted within this space.

In *Nagamandala* the folk tale that was the basis of a play by Girish Karnad and an award-winning Kannada movie by Nagabharana, we are shown a churlish husband who while cohabiting with a concubine, avoids sexual contact with his wife. A blind woman then gives her some root to mix as a paste in his food that would work as an aphrodisiac. However when the food turns red, the wife develops cold feet and instead pours it down an ant-hill. A cobra dwelling in it drinks the concoction, has one look at her and falls in love her. He impregnates her after visiting the unsuspecting woman every night in the shape of her husband. The enraged husband insists that she undergo a chastity test in the presence of the village elders. Under the tutelage of the Naga lover, the wife holds the cobra in her hand and swears that she is innocent. Overnight she is deified as a pativrata and the bemused husband is compelled to accept her along with her son and be at her beck and call. The Naga on seeing her lying peacefully with her family, commits suicide (rather conveniently) whereupon the woman gets her son to perform the last rites. She also ends up getting the concubine to work for her in her house (Dharwadker, 1999).

There is admittedly a sea of difference when these three 'texts' are taken together for a study, since the medium, the genre, the time and place as well as the ideological moorings of the creators would be very different and therefore the variations in the adaptations would also be influenced. The current paper limits itself however to the thematic concerns in the three texts and the ways in which gender identities get constructed and reinforced in them.

The reasons why such a story as *Nagamandala* gains social acceptance need to be explored. Expectedly, this story has variations that surface in regional

renderings. This folk-tale that was narrated to A.K.Ramanujan by a woman in North Karnataka is usually narrated by women as a part of the fertility ritual during Subhramanya Sashti. A young bride who usually finds herself at the lowest rung in the family seeks approval and acceptance with the birth of a child (Kakar, 1988). The yearning for a male child is understandable as it would redeem her in the eyes of her marital family and validate if not sanctify her existence. Therefore the ritual narration of the tale of a snake siring a male child would be sanctioned and recuperated within the larger cultural matrix. The cobra is often seen as a benign figure capable of granting boons to desperate women compelled by the normative, yet performative aspects of maternal femininity. In Indian mythology, the metamorphosing of the snake into a human being for specific purposes is a motif very familiar to people across various cultures.

The near-impossibility of sequestering women and thereby ensuring their sexual fidelity to the husband is a patriarchal fear that manifests itself in the *Smritis* and the *Shastras* quite regularly and is also narrativised in folk-lore and the performative arts. The male dread of a woman's sexuality and the constant anxiety to govern it is also seen in the folk-tale 'The Prince who Married his Own Half' where the prince perforce meets a terrible end. The prince here is so distrustful of women that he is convinced that the only woman capable of fidelity would have to be created from his own body. Despite incarcerating her within the four walls of a house built deep in the forest, the suspicious prince ends up being cheated by the wife whose lover takes on the shape of a serpent. The adulterous wife, perhaps because she is veritably his other half, goes unpunished in this story.

However in most other folk tales, the duplicitous and sexually volatile wife either makes an ignominious exit after being battered brutally, or gets killed for her transgression. Folk tales that revolve around two women wherein the senior one, usually the unjust mother-in-law uses her power over the hapless daughter-in-law end with the equation set right through divine help if necessary. Here, the sympathy is obviously on the side of the oppressed woman. But when it comes to notions of sexuality, the story has to rely upon certain societal expectations and work out formulae that will justify the narrative closure. It is therefore interesting to study the narrative ploys and the literary and performative strategies employed by the narrator, playwright and the film-director in the case of

Nagamandala that renders such a transgression acceptable in the eyes of the viewer.

Uma Chakravarti notes how *Streesvabhava* or the essentially fickle nature of women as perceived by society is sought to be channelised and transformed by *Streedharma* which would enculturate a woman into the ideals of feminine norms. Chakravarti notes how in early Brahminical societies, the norms of femininity in a three-pronged strategy are expected to be internalised by wives in order to qualify as pativratas. The husband too is well within his rights to physically chastise an erring wife. As a last resort he could appeal to the king, who too had to uphold dharma and might use brutal force to punish the deviant wife (Chakravarti, 1993). In *Nagamandala*, the role of the king is taken up by the village elders who are appointed to dispense justice. Interestingly, the sexual escapades of the husband are nowhere to be questioned either by the wife or the elders as his behaviour would have religious sanction and therefore would be socially acceptable too in a blatant display of the double standards of morality prevalent in a patriarchal society.

In *Nagamandala*, the interweaving of complex mythological patterns into the underlying layers of meaning helps the narrator play with extreme degrees of fantasy that might be unavailable at the quotidian level. The culpability of the adulterous wife however, gets mitigated even in religious contexts in the eventuality of the husband's sexual incompetence or reluctance to satisfy her. As Moutoushi Chakravartee says, writers like Karnad deploy devices used by folktales and mythic patterns as rich storehouses of symbolic narratives and refashion them within the structural framework of art. Such stories create moments of rupture but work within certain formulatic limits.

For Rani in Karnad's play, despite being locked up and having a dog placed outside for good measure, the forbidden lover materialises almost as if in fulfillment of a longing in the world of nature for satiation, for a need to fill a void and where forces of nature conspire to make the seemingly impossible possible. Towards the end of the play, Rani wonders as much: "Do desires really reach out from some world beyond right into our beds?" In another sense, the collective social phobia of a woman's essentially volatile and ungovernable sexuality seems to find yet another manifestation in the tale of Rani. Here, the serpent epitomises the idealised lover who incorporates shades of the feminine

and the maternal principles along with a masculine ardour. Various images of sexual union in the world of nature right from frogs, tortoises, crabs, ants, foxes and rattlers are evoked in this context.

As noted by critics, many shrines and corners of gardens are reserved for the worship of snakes, seen as totems of magical powers especially in South India. It is also believed that snakes are a symbol of male vigour. But in the present story, the snake also incorporates androgynous traits in that the snake-lover shows maternal concern and readily bestows favours on Rani. The feminine and nurturing spirit in the serpent-lover can be inferred in the play from the gentle way in which he offers to take Rani to her parents, for whom she is pining within the confines of the house/prison, languishing in boredom and fear. Coming after the indifference, cussedness and thinly-veiled violence of the actual husband Appanna, such love as is offered by the Naga can also symbolise the wishful fantasies that thrill a person even when, or perhaps because it is forbidden.

In the folk-tale, Rani gets away with an illicit lover and a child born outside marriage. In fact, as A.K. Ramanujan aptly points out, folk-tales have subversive potential that undermines patriarchal norms of sexuality. The wife, as Ramanujan shows, gets all that she might desire - a lover, a son, the estranged husband, the tag of a goddess and the free service of the concubine, now turned into a maid. He also shows how the chastity-test too turns out to be a parody of the chastity-ordeals experienced by Sita in that the wife here gets deified precisely because of this illicit love (Dharwadker, 1999). In the folk-tale version, the woman gets to know the true identity of the serpent-lover and both seem to conspire together at the end while in the play, things are only hinted at and she is left with half-truths that render her consciousness of these events in her life rather ambivalent. While there is no straining after the hard truth which could be startling for her, she might have at some subconscious level intuited to it, which explains why she protects the diminutive version of the serpent in her tresses at the end and reverses traditional gender roles. But as observed by the 'story' in the play, there is no getting away from the fact that Rani would realise soon that no two men make love alike. However, inconvenient truths, as the 'story' opines, are often stifled beneath the pillow. They are left to dwell at the fringe of one's consciousness even while causing bouts of agonising at times.

However, in the film, Rani's pristine innocence is sought to be retained till the very end and she is absolutely unaware of the reality of the snake-lover though her husband knows it and brutally kills the snake in a violent encounter with his double, almost as his alter-ego that might embody the softer and more feminine traits a man is loath to admit to. His aggression is also seen in the way he mouths profanities on learning of the wife's pregnancy and the manner in which he mounts a vigorous surveillance on his wife earlier on by getting other men to keep vigil at his house. The reasons for this shift in perception are not hard to seek. The commercial demands of cinema would necessitate such a stance that would vindicate the overt malehood of Appanna and where he would make reparations for his dubious position as a cuckold by killing the serpent.

The rendition of this tale orally at annual rituals revolving around the snake-god however would allow and perhaps even demand the bolder version, since, as mentioned earlier, this would have religious sanction. While the husband in the folk-tale remains clueless and accepts the wife as a *fait accompli*, Karnad's Appanna suffers from a mortifying sense of loss of self and feels foolish when imposed upon to accept Rani and her son whom he has not sired. No such agonising or self-doubt is reserved for the Appanna of the film who with a sinister sense of purpose sets about to kill the serpent-lover. The blatant masculinity of the husband is also evident in the film where Appanna is often shown exercising at the local gymnasium and this is in sharp contrast to the soft feminine charm of Rani, demure, apprehensive and helpless - trapped in a marriage that is not consummated.

For the story of the serpent-lover to be accepted favourably by the reader and the viewer, there are several underlying narratorial ploys that make the recuperation of an explosive theme possible. Even for the wish fulfillment of society channelised through wild fantasies, the underlying gender expectations and performativity seem to be a non-negotiable given. Failing the social act of performing gender invites audience disenchantment with the protagonist and calls for severe punishment in narrative form. Several stories where women characters do not fall within the purview of social expectations end up demonising female sexuality and mirror social norms through the violent end met by transgressive and recalcitrant women. It is seen as their just deserts for their lascivious nature.

Therefore, there seems to be a predictable pattern even in tales that are otherwise liberating and this involves the tacit consent of the narratee, the narrator, the writer and the reader/audience. However, to impute motives to the creators as deliberately and consciously setting about fulfilling the gender norms in the story would be beyond the intentions of the current paper. Nonetheless, a careful examination of the texts reveals ideological patterns that are hard to miss.

In *Nagamandala* the oral tale, the play and the movie for instance, Rani for the most part is portrayed as never failing in the normative role of 'doing' gender. Feminine norms of patience (she waits meekly for days on end for the erring husband to show some affection), sacrifice, capacity to suffer silently, passivity and docility are evident in the way Rani is portrayed. The depiction of a shrewish wife could turn away the sympathy of the onlooker. Gender as a performative is evident in the way she harbours no ill-will towards the uncouth husband, seeking his welfare at all times and baulking at the thought of even unintentionally harming him as, for instance through the red love-potion she brews. She places her trust in a superior force -God to bring him back to her in the course of time and meekly accepts her inferior status as the abandoned wife. In the play, Rani comes across as a frightened child calling out to her mother and longing for the warmth and comfort of her parents' love. Even when Naga makes love to her, her immediate response is to wonder what her parents might think of such an act and that human beings ought to have a sense of shame. Later on of course, as a woman awakened to her own sexual needs she yearns for her lover.

Most importantly, the narrator garners audience sympathy by ensuring that until much later, the wife acts in good faith and is ignorant about the true identity of the serpent-lover. A simple tale of illicit love is tweaked to project the essential 'innocence' of the good wife which therefore absolves her of sexual promiscuity in the eyes of the viewer who again can then safely play the voyeur with no accompanying loss of cultural and moral mooring. The husband too is portrayed as inexplicably 'bad' - aggressive, violent and unfair towards the wife. In the movie, he is shown as performing gender to the hilt - a muscular man making ardent and savage love to the concubine and a harsh husband who severely beats up his wife and mouths dire threats and oaths seeking retribution against Rani and the lover. Rani's utter vulnerability evokes audience sympathy.

It is not just a straightforward acceptance of a woman's right to an adulterous relationship as a proper punishment for the sexual infidelity of the husband, as put forth by Moutoushi Chakravartee. Rather, it is a complex mix of several motivations, the least not being that sexual transgressions in the wife become more socially acceptable when narrative strategies are deployed to uphold gender normativity and its performative aspects even while couching it in a exhilarating and emancipatory narrative. The three 'texts' thus converge on some aspects of this 'doing' of gender but also manifest some differences. The oral tale seems to be the bolder version of the three since it does not show too much concern in proving the wife's 'innocence' till the very end. Karnad's play is a nuanced reading of this story and a sensitive portrayal of the wife. But even in playing with the given material the play falls within the ideological expectations of a conservative society and the wife cannot be depicted as too bold and brazen. In the case of the movie, which incidentally might be a visual treat, the notions of femininity and masculinity are more marked. It ensures that Rani is depicted as an innocent woman till the very end who is ignorant about the existence of the Naga. While this might work well for the commercial interests of the movie, it leaves the critic with the feeling that the departure from the original tale do not bode too well for a rich, complex and therefore ambiguous understanding of the text.

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THE SWORD OF TIPU SULTAN: A STUDY ON THE HISTORICAL AND FICTIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF TIPU SULTAN

Shivshankar Rajmohan AK
Shafwan

Abstract

History is more fictional than fiction itself. But, it is a general tendency to believe that history is always objective and fiction is subjective. For many people, history is the most truthful and fiction is the least truthful matter. Unfortunately, they fail to realize that the "objective" history has multiple versions which often contradict one another. History and fiction are the two sides of the same coin. Both have elements of truth as well as imagination in them. Unfortunately, it is always the winners who write history. Many chapters in the world history have been written with a biased perspective to benefit the political ambitions of the group to which the historian belongs. Tipu Sultan is one of the Muslim kings of India who became a victim to the biased perspectives of historians, both colonial and nationalist. The present study aims at analyzing Bhagwan S. Gidwani's novel The Sword of Tipu Sultan with the aim of looking at Tipu Sultan from different perspectives: historical perspective and fictional perspective, with the intention of revealing the fictionality of history. Dealing with the historical correctness of the novel is not the aim of this study and the use of historical accounts of Tipu Sultan will be limited to establish the differences in them.

Keywords : Fiction, History, Ideology, Representation, Tipu Sultan.

"A lie has many variations, the truth none." - African Proverb

"If you repeat a lie long enough it becomes a truth." - Joseph Goebbels

It is a general tendency to believe that history is always objective and fiction is subjective. For many people, history is the most truthful and fiction is the least truthful matter. Unfortunately, they fail to realize that the "objective" history has multiple versions which often contradict one another. History is more fictional

Mr Shivshankar Rajmohan AK, Assistant Professor, Dept. of P.G Studies in English, SDM College (Autonomous) Ujire, **Email:** shivrmohan@gmail.com.

Mr Shafwan, Student, Dept. of P.G Studies in English, SDM College (Autonomous) Ujire.

than the fiction itself. History and fiction are the two sides of the same coin. Both have elements of truth as well as imagination in them. Napoleon Bonaparte once remarked: "What is history but a tale told by winner." Unfortunately, it is always the winners who write history. Americans write the history of Afghan war, Sinhalese write the history of Tamil rebellion and Indian military writes the history of Naxal uprising. The people who win the wars decide what is right and what is wrong, denying the people who lose their fundamental right to tell their side of the story.

In June 2000, the National Geographic published an article on Alexander. George Kingston wrote a reply to that article which was published in the next issue of the magazine. It goes like this:

Your article cries out for comparison with the December 1996 article on Genghis Khan. Both men, with similar size armies, conquered much of their known world, leaving behind short lived empires that rapidly broke up into independent kingdoms. Yet Alexander is portrayed as the spearhead of cultural advance who happened to massacre some folks along the way, while Genghis Khan is portrayed primarily as a killer who happened to leave some culture in his wake. One gets the impression that leaders of European hordes are held to a different standard than the leaders of non-European ones. (5)

The difference in the historical perspectives about these two great conquerors can be attributed to the fact that the major part of the world history is written by the Europeans and Alexander is a European while Genghis Khan is not. The Europeans had political and economic control over many parts of the world and hence none could question what they said about history. Winston Churchill rightly said "History is written by the victors." Needless to say, what the victors say about history is not completely true.

Many chapters in the world history have been written with a biased perspective to benefit the political ambitions of the group to which the historian belongs. Tipu Sultan is one of the Muslim kings of India who became a victim to the biased perspectives of historians, both colonial and nationalist. The present study aims at analyzing Bhagwan S. Gidwani's novel *The Sword of Tipu Sultan* with the aim of looking at Tipu Sultan from different perspectives: Historical perspective, and fictional perspective, with the intention of revealing the fictionality

of history. Dealing with the historical correctness of the novel is not the aim of this study and the use of historical accounts on Tipu Sultan will be limited to establish the differences in them.

William Kirkpatrick and Mark Wilks were the early historians to write on Tipu Sultan and their work formed the basis of later works on him. Both of them portrayed Tipu as a fanatic Muslim king who was bent upon not only destroying the British but also the non-Muslim subjects of his own kingdom. Kirkpatrick's and Wilks's works dwelt on the cruelty inflicted by the Sultan on the prisoners at Srirangapatna fort and also his alleged cruelty towards the Mangalorean Christians and the Hindu community of Malabar. The same fanatic and cruel picture of Tipu dominated the later works by the colonial historians and the nationalist writers. Many modern historians like Kate Brittlebank, Irfan Habib and Mohibbul Hasan consider the works of Kirkpatrick and Wilks as unreliable because of their close association with the British administration of Tipu's time. Both of them were officers in the English East India Company and took part in the military campaigns against Tipu. William Kirkpatrick was a Persian interpreter to General Harris during the Fourth Anglo-Mysore war and he was appointed as the military secretary to Lord Mornington after the fall of Srirangapatna. Mark Wilks accompanied General Barry Close on a diplomatic mission to Mysore in 1787 and served as a political resident at Mysore from 1803 to 1808. Kate Brittlebank, an Australian historian, writes that the works of Kirkpatrick and Wilks on Tipu's history are not entirely reliable because of their military activities against Tipu and their close associations with the administrations of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Wellesley (10-12). Marxist historian Irfan Habib argues that these early British writers had powerful political objectives in depicting Tipu Sultan as a cruel ruler from whose clutches the British had freed Mysore province (5). Mohibbul Hasan Khan in his book *The History of Tipu Sultan* writes:

The reasons why Tipu was reviled are not far to seek. Englishmen were prejudiced against him because they regarded him as their most formidable rival and an inveterate enemy, and because, unlike other Indian rulers, he refused to become a tributary of the English company. Many of the atrocities of which he has been accused were allegedly fabricated either by persons embittered and angry on account of defeats which they sustained at his hands, or by the prisoners of war who had suffered punishments which they thought they did not

deserve. He was also misrepresented by those who were anxious to justify the wars of aggression which the company's government had waged against him. Moreover, his achievements were belittled and his character blackened in order that people of Mysore might forget him and rally around the Raja, thus helping in the consolidation of the new regime. (368)

In response to the communal sentiments in India that rose against Tipu during the turbulent period of 1990s, Brittlebank writes that "it is perhaps ironic that the aggressive Hinduism of some members of the Indian community in the 1990s should drawn upon an image of Tipu which...was initially constructed by the subcontinent's colonizers" (2).

Sequeira and Quadros give the following opinion on Tipu Sultan in their book History of Karnataka: A. D. 1336 to 1956: He [Tipu Sultan] was not cruel as some writers would have it. His cruelties were in general inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies...It is said that his chief title to fame and greatness rests on his work as an administrator...It is said that Tippu was a religious bigot. But it is not correct. He was tolerant towards Hindus. He did not impose the zezia tax on Hindus as Aurangazeb did. He had appointed Hindus as his ministers. He sent rich presents to the Hindu temples at Nanjangud. It is said that he built a Shiva temple at Nanjangud and called himself 'Hakim Nanjunda'. He has great regard for the Swamiji of Sringeri...Tippu like his father Haidar, kept religion and politics apart, and rarely permitted his personal beliefs to influence his administrative policies. He treated his muslim subjects with equal harshness when they were guilty of treason or disloyalty. Tippu was a remarkable personality with a sound moral character, rarely seen in men in position. He was well educated, intensely devout, valiant and tactful. One of the best estimates of the personality of Tippu is perhaps the one quoted by J. R. Henderson- 'He was a great man of perseverance and the art of leading man's heart more than they were aware of or cared to acknowledge, he had patient application and nothing was done without his sanction even to the meanest affairs and the business of his dominions was vast, you will allow he was brave and died like a soldier. He was kind and considerate to his servants and a steady friend to those he loved, Mashalla, he was a great man.' (314, 315)

Sequeira and Quadros's account of Tipu Sultan is highly positive in tone and it

depicts him as an ideal king. It also frees Tipu of any accusation of being fanatic or biased towards his subjects. Unfortunately, this not the entire story. Sequeira and Quadros's version about Tipu Sultan is not the only version about him that we find in history. One such contradictory version is that of Lewin B. Bowring.

Lewin B. Bowring was a member of the Bengal Civil Service who served as the commissioner of Mysore from 1862-1870. In 1893, he wrote a book on the history of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan titled *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan and the Struggle with the Musalman Powers of the South*. In this book, he depicts Tipu Sultan as a cruel and fanatic king who had no consideration for his subjects. Bowring writes:

Of Tipu's ferocious character there are unfortunately abundant proofs...As they are taken from his own correspondence there can be no doubt as to their authenticity. In one letter, written during the progress of the siege of Nargund, he says:-

'In the event of your being obliged to assault the place, every living creature in it, whether man or woman, old or young, child, dog, cat, or anything else, must be put to the sword...'

In another, addressed to an officer in Coorg, he remarks:-

'You are to make a general attack on the Coorgs, and, having put to the sword or made prisoners the whole of them, both slain and the prisoners, with the woman and children, are to be made Musalmans'.

Again alluding to a rising at Supa in Kanara, he writes to Badr-uz-zaman Khan:-

'Ten years ago, from ten to fifteen thousand men were hung upon the trees of that district; since which time the aforesaid trees have been waiting for more men. You must therefore hang upon trees all such of the inhabitants of that district as have taken a lead in these rebellious proceedings'.

....But enough has been said to show the character of a ruler, who urged by his religious bigotry, innate cruelty and despotism, thought little of sacrificing thousands of lives to his ardent zeal and revengeful feelings. These darker shades in his disposition are not relieved by any evidence of princely generosity, such as Haidar Ali occasionally showed...." (218-220)

Thus, according to Bowring Tipu was a king who was as cruel as a king ever could be.

However, it is important to note here that in the passage above quoted, Bowring gives excerpts from the letters which he says were written by Tipu to his officers and uses them as proof for the darker side of Tipu's nature. But he does not provide sources, numbers or dates of these letters. Hence a common reader has to blindly believe Bowring's words and he has no means to verify them. Bowring himself acknowledges the existence of conflicting views about the history of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. In the preface to his book, he writes:

...The materials for such a memoir [on Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan], although often contradictory, according to the source whence they are derived, are sufficiently copious for the greater part of the narrative. The conflicting views of English, French and native authorities regarding Haidar Ali and his son make it difficult to form an absolutely correct estimate of their career, while the limited space at his disposal precludes the writer from doing full justice to the course of events referred to in the narrative.... (5)

The reason for the conflicting views of the British and the French about Tipu Sultan can be attributed to the fact that he was a political opponent of the British and an ally of the French. In fact, Tipu's army had a unit of French military officers from the time of his father who remained with him till the middle of the Second Anglo-Mysore war. These French soldiers ably assisted the Mysore army in its fight against the mighty British. The political hostility between Britain and France was the chief reason for this French assistance to Tipu. But, when the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1783, it ended the enmity between the two nations, French soldiers abandoned Tipu's army amidst a raging war against British. Tipu still continued his friendly relations with the French and went to the extent of seeking military aid from Napoleon Bonaparte against the British. Though there have been many historians like J. R. Henderson who have written positively about Tipu, there have been many like Bowring who have written otherwise. For the latter group of historians, Tipu Sultan has always been a religious bigot, fanatic and cruel ruler. Prof. Barkuru Udaya in his book *Haidar Ali-Tipu: Ithihasa Kathana* (Historiographical overview) says that this attitude of British historians has more to do with the British propaganda than historical

authenticity. Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan's strong opposition to the English East India Company's attempts to dominate over Mysore, Prof. Udaya says, made the English to spread such lies against the duo (14). Driven by propaganda or otherwise, correctness of history or the past is a problematic issue. Slavoj Žižek, the Slovenian Marxist philosopher and cultural critic says in his book *The Parallax View* that the whole idea about a specific issue can be obtained only by combining different points of view on that issue. Since each historian looks at the past with his own point of view, any work of history cannot be considered as "the ultimate truth." As Žižek says, perhaps it is only possible to reach the ultimate truth of history by combining the different versions of various historians.

Bhagwan S. Gidwani's novel *The Sword of Tipu Sultan* tries to free Tipu Sultan from the unsympathetic and biased perspectives of colonial and nationalist historians. Gidwani's interest in Tipu Sultan was kindled by a French research student at British Museum, London in 1963. The French student praised Tipu Sultan for his decision to die fighting rather than trying to save himself. Inspired by the remark of the French student on Tipu's martyrdom, Gidwani started his research on Tipu Sultan and collected material from Indian, British, French, Dutch, Turkish, Persian and Portuguese archives. He gave up attempting to write a historic text on Tipu and wrote a novel on the basis of his research which he thought would do more justice to the character of Tipu Sultan. The novel was published in July 1976 when the Emergency was at its height in India. It depicted Tipu Sultan as a benevolent and secular ruler who put his country before everything. The novel tries to restore the identity of Tipu Sultan with its original dignity and in doing so it attempts to restore the dignity to the often misinterpreted and misrepresented identity of the Indian Muslim in the post-independent period.

Gidwani argues in the preface to the novel that the imaginative judgment that he has made about the life of Tipu Sultan has a firm foundation in the historical truth from which he has tried his best not to stray away. When we understand the depth of his research on the subject, in Indian and foreign archives, we are highly convinced of the novel's factual basis. However, dealing with the historical correctness of the novel is not the aim of this study. Gidwani uses different methods of narration in the novel. Sometimes he becomes the omniscient narrator who knows everything about everyone. But most of the time, he looks

at the world through the eyes of Tipu and at Tipu through the eyes of his friends and enemies.

One of the most interesting passages in the novel is where Tipu Sultan ponders over the future of India when he was supposed to ascend the throne after Haidar Ali's death in the middle of the Second Anglo-Mysore war. Here Tipu is in a dilemma about assuming the royal responsibilities because many of his father's loyal commanders are conspiring against him now. Then Tipu thinks about his subjects towards whom he has a moral responsibility. That is when the above said passage appears. It reads:

Will India find herself again? Tipu asked himself. Will she survive the danger and horror of today and recapture the dream of her past to rebuild herself on secure foundations of freedom, justice and national unity? Tipu's mind went to the mountains and rivers of India, to the forests and the broad fields, to the valleys and the plains, to the panorama of India's cultural heritage of thousands of years, to the faces and figures of the men, women and children of this proud sensitive land. He tried to fathom what lay behind these millions of eyes of theirs. He could see in them their capacity for immense self sacrifice. No, they would not lose their hope, nor their dignity nor their faith.

'We shall endure' said Tipu Sultan fervently. (138)

The passage given above depicts Tipu Sultan as a great nationalist who had high concern about the land and the people of India. Tipu's fear for the safety of India arises because of his concern about the disunity among Indian rulers and his anxiety about the increasing domination of the English East India Company in the political affairs of India. The tenderness of Tipu's feelings towards his land is beautifully described here. It also creates a positive impression of Tipu's character in the minds of readers.

Throughout the novel, Gidwani stresses the kindness and humanity of Tipu Sultan's character. He shows us that Tipu's kindness was not only limited to his friends but also extended towards his enemies. Consider the following passage which describes the aftermath of one of the battles of the Second Anglo-Mysore war:

Baille [a British commander] had been wounded. Tipu had accepted surrender on

the battlefield and complimented him on the gallant defense, assuring him that his defeat was but the fortune of war. A palanquin was ordered and Tipu assisted Baillie towards it. In the effort, Baillie's wound, bandaged though it was, began to bleed and some of his blood was smeared on Sultan's sleeve. Baillie courteously apologized.

'Do not apologize,' the Sultan said. 'It is gallant blood,' and then after a long pause, looking at his sleeve, added 'it has the same color as my blood.' (185)

This passage depicts Tipu Sultan as a great humanist and a philosopher who could transcend the boundaries of the king and the common man. It also frees him of the accusation that he was not kind towards his British prisoners of war.

There is a passage in the novel where Tipu Sultan speaks about his religious policy with Maulvi Al Amin of Muscat. The Maulvi asks Tipu Sultan why he is giving equal support to Hinduism and Islam in his kingdom and why he is not following the ways of his contemporary and early Muslim kings who extended exclusive support for Islam. The Maulvi suggests that such a policy would ensure fanatical support of his people towards the cause of the state. Gidwani continues:

Tipu Sultan replied with a courteous smile: 'I have no doubt they were wise in their ways. But then there are perhaps some differences between their goals and mine. You said I should support the religion of my own people. Here comes the difference. Who are my people? ...All of them...those that ring the temple bells and those that pray in the mosques-they are my people and this land is theirs and mine...There is another difference...You suggested creation of disunity as a means of achieving power but it is to assume that attainment of power is to be regarded as a goal which is higher than that of achieving unity...Let me finally say that I am born of this soil which has given birth to and nurtured many religions. What do these religions teach me? That all men are brothers...I have read with respect the Hindu system of philosophy, their Vedas and their Shasthras. They regard all religions as containing the essential elements of truth in them and enjoin an attitude of respect and reverence towards them all. The Quran, I believe, teaches me likewise. Tell me, have I misunderstood the Quran?' (267, 268)

This is one of the most important passages in the novel which strongly asserts

the secular spirit of Tipu Sultan. It is important to note here that the above conversation takes place with an Islamic scholar from Arabia and Tipu rejects his suggestion to discriminate between his subjects on the basis of religion. Gidwani highlights the rationality in Tipu's character here. Tipu's in depth knowledge of various religious philosophies, his belief in the truth of all religions and his love for his subjects can also be seen in this part of the novel.

Gidwani does not limit the use of stream of consciousness technique for narration to the protagonist of the novel, Tipu himself. He also uses it to show us the viewpoint of many minor and major characters who are in some way associated with Tipu. Some of these characters are Tipu's friends, some are his enemies. This helps the readers to look at Tipu from various points of view and form their own idea of him on the basis of these viewpoints. Brahmin Shivji is one such minor character who helps us understand Tipu better. He was a Bengali Brahmin who lost his wife and children to the British atrocities during a famine. He entered the service of Tipu who rescued him from the English prison in Madras. He became Tipu's secretary. Shivji was with Tipu in a battlefield in Malabar when the news of Haidar Ali's death reached him. The Second Anglo-Mysore war was raging and Tipu was immediately summoned by Purnaiya, his father's Prime Minister, to Mysore for assuming royal responsibilities. His father's death was a great blow to Tipu and he immediately ordered his troops to pack up. Shivji had the habit of writing his personal diary in the form of letters to his lost sons. The one written that day is as follows:

At the Stroke of midnight, the Sultan after reading Purnaiya's message said that his father was dead. His voice was gentle and the tone quiet....The Sultan sat in his chair with his faraway look....What was he thinking of, my dear sons?....I will tell you what I think I saw on his face and in his heart. Compassion. Yes, compassion for the weak, for the innocent and for the helpless-countless thousands upon thousands on whom the aliens would unleash their remorseless war machine in an effort to gain supremacy, to take territory and to plunder treasures. With Haidar Ali gone, this would be their heaven sent opportunity to trample the soil under their iron heel, to shed rivers of blood, to separate lovers from their beloveds and fathers from their sons. Yes, my sons, the Sultan has seen this in his mind's eye and grieves not for his loss but for the unfortunates who pine for their sons. Yes, he grieves for you... (48, 49)

This letter of Brahmin Shivji achieves two different goals simultaneously, it glorifies Tipu and demonizes the British. The letter shows Tipu's kindness towards his servants and his concern towards his subjects. At the same time it portrays the cruelty of the British. Throughout the novel, Gidwani juxtaposes Tipu's heroic qualities with the villainous nature of the British to bring out the greatness of his protagonist's character. In fact, Tipu's heroic picture which emerges out of the novel is not only because of his great qualities but also because of the cruel acts of the British.

Gidwani stresses on Tipu's love for freedom in the novel. In fact, it is believed that Tipu Sultan had once said: "It is better to live as a Tiger for one day rather than to exist as a mouse for hundred years." The Sword of Tipu Sultan strongly asserts Tipu's love for the rights of man, his admiration for the American war of Independence and his reverence for the American Declaration of Independence. Tipu even tries to send financial aid to Benjamin Franklin, one of the leaders of the American Revolution. But it fails because of a cunning English agent named Frederick Schwartz. Gidwani writes:

Tipu Sultan concluded his address by telling them: 'That is why I rejoice my friends, over the victory of France, over the victory of America-for in that victory is the triumph for the rights of Man....Every blow that was struck in the cause of American liberty, by Americans, by Frenchmen, was a blow in the cause of liberty throughout the world, in France, India and elsewhere-and so long as a single insolent and savage tyrant remains, the struggle shall continue.'

These simple war-hardened soldiers of France....were unlettered men with little knowledge of history or political theory. Did they have an understanding of what Tipu Sultan was trying to tell them? No one knows. But what is known is that in France, six years thence when the royal prison fortress of Bastille was stormed and when the French Revolution flowered to proclaim the abolition of a tyrannical monarchy, amongst those who rook up the banner of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were many who had listened to Tipu Sultan's address on that day. As Gourgaud lay dying in Paris from the bullets of King's militia, he said, 'Let Tipu Sultan know that I died for a dream that he inspired.' (262, 263)

The last part of this passage, which portrays Tipu Sultan as an inspiration for the French revolutionaries, grants to his personality a transcendental dimension. It

liberates him from the stereotypical image of an oriental king ruling over a small kingdom and makes him an international figure whose influence even touched the French politics.

The figure of Tipu Sultan that exists in the minds of Indians today has two faces. The first face is that of a secular ruler who always thought of the welfare of his subjects and a great warrior who was a nightmare of the British. The second face is that of a fanatic Muslim ruler and a tyrant who converted thousands of Hindus and Christians to Islam during his rule. The first face of Tipu Sultan is supported by secular intellectuals like Girish Karnad, Ko. Chennabasappa and others. The second face is strongly asserted by the right wing thinkers like novelist S. L. Bhyrappa, journalist Pratap Simha and others. The first face of Tipu Sultan has a lot to do with the secular temperament of the Indian culture and also because of Tipu Sultan's patronizing of the Hindu temples in his kingdom. In fact, Ko. Chennabasappa edited a booklet titled Hindu Dharma Rakshaka Tipu Sultan (Tipu Sultan-The Protector of Hinduism) which was published in 2003. In this book, Chennabasappa presents historical evidences to prove his point that Tipu Sultan showed a highly favorable attitude towards Hinduism in his kingdom and hails him as a great patriot. In 2006, Girish Karnad strongly opposed D. V. Shankaramurthy, the then education minister of Karnataka, who gave a statement that Tipu Sultan had shown an unfavorable attitude towards the Kannada language and hence he should not be celebrated as a national hero.

The second face of Tipu Sultan, the idea that he was a fanatic and tyrant, is mainly due to the rise of Hindu nationalism in post-independent India. In the 1990s, the televised version of The Sword of Tipu Sultan had to face severe legal disputes due to its positive portrayal of Tipu Sultan. In the discussions that followed the controversial statement of Shankaramurthy, S. L. Bhyrappa, the leading right wing thinker from Karnataka, severely criticized Karnad's opposition and strongly agreed with the minister. PratapSimha, a Kannada journalist (currently a Member of Parliament) published a book titled Tippu Sultana Swatanrya Veerana? (Is Tipu Sultan a Freedom Fighter?) in 2013 in which he depicted Tipu Sultan as darkly as possible. He further criticized Tipu Sultan's rule through one of his newspaper columns in 2014 when the Karnataka government sent a tableau of Tipu Sultan to the Republic Day Parade at New Delhi. Though Bhyrappa and Simha cite historical evidences to prove their point about Tipu

Sultan, their dislike towards him mainly stems from their adherence to the Hindutva or the Hindu nationalist ideology. This ideology refuses to see Muslim rulers of India like Tipu Sultan in a positive light and considers it a threat to the Hindu nationalism. This is more evident in the views of B. Chidanandamurthy, a right wing historian from Karnataka, on Tipu Sultan. During the 2012 controversy about naming a university after Tipu Sultan, Chidanandamurthy argued that Tipu Sultan's grants towards Hindu temples could not be considered as the proof for his pro-Hindu policy or his secularism. He strongly argued that these were merely political gimmicks of Tipu Sultan to gain the support of his Hindu officials and subjects.

Tipu Sultan is a great ruler for Gidwani, a national hero for Karnad and Chennabasappa, a fanatic Muslim ruler for Simha, Bhyrappa and Chidanandamurthy. There is a great contradiction among these views since one disposes what the other proposes. However, none of these views can be declared wrong, because the moment Tipu Sultan dies, he becomes part of fiction. As Peter Barry says "the word of past replaces the world of past" (169). Different accounts of Tipu Sultan's life have replaced his actual life. There are many ways to look at Tipu Sultan and each individual is free to choose his own way. As Salman Rushdie said, though we all use the same ingredients to make chutney, each preparation tastes different; but all of them possess the authentic taste of truth (461).

There is a beautiful story in Indian folklore about four blind men and an elephant. The story goes like this: Once four blind men went to see an elephant. As they couldn't literally see it, they tried to grasp its shape by touching it. The first one touched the trunk and declared that the elephant was like a big snake. The second one touched the tusk and said that the elephant was like hard wood. The third one groped a leg and said that the elephant was like a pillar. The fourth one touched the tail and said that the elephant was like a ponytail. All the four accounts of the four blind men about the elephant are like the various versions of history: they are not wrong but they are neither completely true. Each historian, like a blind man, tries to understand history with his limited capabilities. He grasps a few parts of it but he can never get the complete picture. Though all historical versions are true, there is nothing like the ultimate historical truth. Trying to grasp it would be as futile as a blind man trying to "see" an elephant.

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POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY: HINDUTVA SPATIAL STRATEGIES AND ASSAULT ON SYNCRETIC CULTURE

Samuel Sequeira

Abstract

Historical circumstances necessitate adaptation and social change. In the case of India, a land of multiple migrations, invasions and conquests, numerous cultures have come in contact with each other forming a unique mosaic called 'Indian Culture'. The result of such a living also has created various kinds of syncretic practices, especially of a religious type, engendering collective memory of symbols and sites of practice. These tolerant and assimilationist practices have sustained a multicultural Indian culture of millennia. However, from the 1980s' with the arrival of the Hindutva ideology and the political movement in Indian politics, and with the pursuit of what are called 'spatial strategies', the syncretic culture of India has suffered a huge blow. This has resulted in numerous communal riots, widening further the rift between communities and pushing the minorities into the influence of fundamentalist elements in their religion. If Globalization is one of the factors that has precipitated these conflicts, the wounds from the Indian Partition of 1947 remain a perennial source of Hindu-Muslim rift. Now that the Hindutva politics has achieved its unprecedented success in the Indian elections held in May 2014, one needs to wait and see if they continue to pursue their fascist agenda or operate within the democratic structure of the Indian constitution.

KEY WORDS: *Collective memory, Hindutva, fascism, syncretic culture, spatial strategies*

INTRODUCTION

Historical circumstances necessitate social change and adaptation. If people cannot but coexist, even their gods must obey the historical imperative and their saints perform miracles for both or all the contesting communities. The subsequent reconfigurations of collective memory construct cultural practices that sustain the changed socio-historical inevitabilities; only until new historical actors arrive with their ability to contest the collective memory and force changes in terms of existence for communities sustained by collective memory. And thus, with their newfound power they force erasure of collective memory (Connerton, 2011). This dynamics of power within politics is evident throughout the world, as power

Mr Samuel Sequeira, Postgraduate Researcher, Cardiff School of English, Communication and Philosophy, Cardiff University, John Percival Building, Colum Drive Cardiff Wales, United Kingdom CF10 3EU,
e-mail: sequeiras74@gmail.com

shifts from one group to another, and is especially manifest through ethnic violence. The latest examples of such ethnic violence ranges from Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Srilanka, India and Eastern Europe.

India is a land of multiple religious and cultural traditions fused together to evolve into what is understood as Indian culture or way of life. If Hinduism itself is a fusion and synthesis of various Indian cultures, the arrival of the Semitic religions to India instead of changing this assimilative nature of Indian culture, enhanced it by adding further variety to its pluralism. However, religious conflicts have also been part of this development due to the exclusivist identities espoused by fundamentalist religious ideologies at different times(Pandey, 1992).

If these conflicts can be treated as normal in a caste-ridden society, all this has been changing radically since the 1980s when Hindu Fundamentalists arrived on the political scene armed with a divisive,exclusivist and majoritarian ideology named 'Hindutva' claiming legitimacy and political support from majority Hindus. Their discourse on 'Hindu hurt', claimed by citing multiple invasions and imperialisms of the past, the Partition of India in 1947 blamed exclusively on Muslim communal politics,Pakistan's meddling in Kashmir through a proxy war since 1947, and the alleged minority (Muslim) appeasement policies adopted by the successive 'secular' governments in India, have been especially successful in forging a 'Hindu' majoritarian identity in the face of globalisation and a neo-liberal economic order. The key strategies adopted and successfully implemented by 'Hindutva' politics to mobilise people around a Hindu religious identity can be termed as 'spatial strategies' employed to appropriate the national space as 'Hindu' and thus use it towards a broader social struggle for hegemony (Deshpande, 1995).

This article intends to focus how with the revival of fundamentalist Hindu ideologies and the successful deployment of their 'spatial strategies' since the 1980s and '90s, the syncretic traditions of India have come under assault by way of a demand from these groups to claim a number of places of worship, often the sites of syncretic religious practices,(sites of collective memory), as exclusively Hindu. The culmination of such claims and the consequent mobilisations resulted in the destruction of a 15th century Mosque (Babri Masjid) at Ayodya in North India in 1992, followed by large scale attacks and killings. This was the first

blood drawn from these mobilisations, but the strategy of 'dispute', 'claim' and 'mobilisation' continued drawing thousands of such sites into the orbit of this political strategy.

The specific focus of the article here will be on one such religious site named Baba Budangiri in the hills of Chikmagalur in Karnataka State, one of the states of Southern India. This is a site where both Hindus and Muslims prayed and celebrated their religions together without any significant conflicts of interest. However, recently, this site has come under Hindutva assault falling in line with their ideology of 'spatial appropriation'.

The key argument here is, how globalisation has been engendering and facilitating such identity consciousness and conflicts and, as a result, affecting the communal harmony of local communities. Hence, the underlying reason for this phenomenon of the rise of identity consciousness is traced back to the opportunities offered by globalisation, migration and economic development, and as a consequence, of the arrival of metropolitan capital¹ to the hitherto agrarian economies. Consequently the economic change has disturbed the balance of power between communities, setting a stage for identity politics and violent conflicts. It is also further argued how neo-liberal economic policies adopted in India over the last few decades, instead of strengthening the multicultural fabric of the country, has caused identities to proliferate and compete against one another, often violently, resulting in the triumph of the 'predatory identity' of the hegemonic discourse of Hindutva to emerge as an all-embracing identity that treats the minorities and secularists as second-class citizens (Appadurai, 2006).

COLLECTIVE (CULTURAL) MEMORY OF MULTICULTURAL LIVING

India is a land of multiple invasions and migrations not only over a span of several centuries but over several millennia. All these invasions and migrations have had influences over the native cultures making Indian culture one of the most syncretic in the world. Hinduism itself is a fusion and synthesis of multiple Indian cultures and traditions with multiple roots without having a single founder. Hence, due to a lack of orthodoxy unlike that of Semitic religions, Indian religious traditions were more open to new practices and ways of living. This continues even today in the form of westernization. Despite there being limiting practices such as vegetarianism among orthodox Hindus, it has not stopped such

conservative groups from absorbing elements of cultural practices from other cultures.

To provide a brief sketch of the migrations and invasions that created what is called 'Indian Culture' one only need identify a few such major cultural influences. If Aryans arrived from West Asia region around 2000 BCE, Persians arrived around 3rd Century BCE. Muslims started ruling in some parts of north India in the 13th century and continued until the 18th century ending up ruling large parts of India. With Vasco da Gama reaching Calicut on the 20th May 1498, Europeans of various hues followed, culminating with the British as the rulers of India until 1947. The prevailing religions throughout these centuries have been various traditions of Vedic religion (Hindu), Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Sikhism and other tribal and indigenous religions. Due to the intermingling and dialogical effects of all these religions there appeared multiple and syncretistic strands of religious and cultural practices all over India. These practices were necessitated by socio-political realities of Indian history. Such multicultural living over centuries also produced collective memories that were transmitted over the centuries through cultural practices which were most seen in culinary, musical and religious practices, not to mention common sites and traditions of worship and celebrations. A kind of syncretic religious practice between Indian traditions and Islam were expressed among the Hindus in the form of Bhakti (Devotional) Movements and among Muslims in the form of Sufism. Even Indian Christians are not an exception here. Over the years they have adopted a number of Indian cultural symbols in their ritual practices, not to mention Indian music and dance in Christian Liturgy. These various groups of religious practitioners have exemplified the syncretic² practices that were a hallmark of Indian multiculturalism throughout its long history.

KARNATAKA: A SYNCRETIC, MULTICULTURAL LAND

If the story of India is one of syncretic traditions, Karnataka, being one of the southern states (provinces), also shares a similar history that is even more syncretic and multicultural. Various strands of Hindu traditions along with its protest movements were prevalent in Karnataka when Islam arrived there as early as 7th century AD through the trade contacts with the Arab world. Sufi saints came along with traders and spread the message of Islam. Muslim kings ruled

Karnataka from the 13th to the 18th century. Christianity arrived in Kerala as early as the 1st century AD through St Thomas, the apostle of Jesus and via European Christianity in the 16th century with the arrival of the Portuguese. The present population of the state is 61 million with 83% being Hindus, 12% Muslims, 2% Christians and the rest made up of other minorities.

One very important result of the influence of Islam in Karnataka was the development of religious toleration among Hindus and Muslims. The prevailing socio-political situation demanded that the people of different religious traditions give up much of their fanaticism and devise modes of living together. As a result, a spirit of tolerance and mutual regard for one another developed among them as can be seen from how Hindus began to venerate Muslim saints and Muslims to show an equal veneration for Hindu saints. They incorporated many ideas of one another. This happened predominantly through the presence of Sufi saints and Muslim devotees who had settled in the Coastal Karnataka from the seventh century onwards (Bolar, 2011). By implication, a number of syncretistic religious practices came into existence throughout Karnataka. Baba Budan Giri is one such religious place where both Muslims and Hindus practised their devotion to a saint whom both the communities venerated as holy and an avatar (incarnation) of God. This will be discussed further below, but, before illustrating how this site became a target of the 'spatial strategies' of Hindutva politics, it should be noted how wide-spread the syncretic cultural practices were in Karnataka.

MANY EXAMPLES OF SYNCRETIC LIVING

As is the case all over India, in Karnataka there are several *Dargahs*³ and *Peethas*⁴ venerated equally by Muslims and Hindus. In these places many of the cultural symbols used by both the communities have common meanings. Practices such as lighting the lamps, breaking the coconuts, offering *arathis*⁵, wearing beads, etc., are practised equally by adherents of both religions. Such symbols were never issues of contestation until puritanical and fundamentalist elements in Islam and Hinduism brought their identity politics into religious spaces. There are several examples of such practices related to various places of worship. In fact, most of the villages have one such *dargah* or *peetha* that has been sites of syncretic religious practices and symbols of communal harmony. Here are a few examples. Among the Muslim *dargahs* Bande Nawaz in Bidar, Gulam Shah Vali in Davangere,

Mulang Shah Vali, Syed Madani in Mangalore, Darvesh Shah Vali in Shivamogga are the *dargahs* where both Muslims and Hindus venerated the saints from Muslim traditions. There are a number of temples which are also venerated by Muslims. Among the Hindu sites for example Bappa Nadu temple, Mulki, near Mangaluru, a coastal town in the West of India bordering Kerala, Shishunala Sharifa temple in Dharwad district, Ilaval Shakti temple in Mysore, Yellamma temple in Dharwad are some of them. These locations indicate the geographic spread of such practices all over the state. In these places syncretic culture is expressed in many ways. To quote some examples,

In Holeyal in Dharwad district the '*gaddige*' or the seat is constructed in such a way that half of it is in Muslim style and another half is in Hindu style. In Mulki, the car festival has to begin with the consent of Bappa Byari family which is a Muslim family belonging to a local Muslim community. There is temple in Dakshina Kannada district named Kateel Durga Parameshwari temple where every year Muslims have to perform an '*aata*' (popular folkdrama). In a place called Anandpur in Shivamogga (another district of Karnataka) the temple and mosque have a common wall (Assadi 1999:747).

THE CASE OF BABA BUDANGIRI/DATTA PEETHA IN KARNATAKA

As already mentioned above, one such unique site is located in the hills called the Western Ghats in Karnataka. It is called Baba Budan Giri cave shrine and it is where both Muslims and Hindus offered prayers. Muslims prayed to a Sufi saint named Hazrat Dada Hayat Meer Kalandhar, who arrived in India in 1005 AD to preach Sufism. Tradition has it that when he arrived in India, he chose this cave as a place for his meditation. This same place is also believed by some Hindus to be the seat of Dattatreya Swamy, who is said to be the avatar (incarnation) of Vishnu, a Hindu god; he is believed to have vanished from one of the caves to Kashi, another holy place for Hindus in North India, to be reincarnated in the future.

For hundreds of years Muslims celebrated the saint's feast on the same day and at the very spot where the local Hindus celebrated the birthday of Datta Swamy. Collective memory has it that Dada Peer and Datta Swamy are one and the same. In other words, both the Hindus and Muslims prayed to the same saint but in different names. This shrine and the collective memory which it evoked is a

symbol of Hindus and Muslims living in harmony with each other not merely by respecting each other's religious traditions and ways of life, but even sharing each other's religious symbols; thus living a syncretic culture. This was necessitated by a history of Hindus and Muslims socially positioned to interact with each other due to their socio-economic entanglements for several centuries⁶. The story goes that after clearing the area Dada decided to settle down for meditation. The tradition narrates a miracle to have happened.

He needed water to perform '*wazu*'⁷ for his prayers. He was a stranger in this area and did not know where water was available. He prayed and started digging the ground in front of the place he had selected as his seat of mediation and found a perennial spring. He thanked god and spent the night in prayer and meditation. The next morning a brahmin and a jangama enter the cave, as per their custom, for worship. Seeing Dada absorbed in meditation they thought that he was the incarnation of Sri Dattatreya Swamy (Sajjade Nishin, Hazrat Dada Hayat Meer Khalandar, 1979:10 as quoted in Assadi 1999).

Like the Hindus, Muslims also believe that Dada had disappeared from one of the caves to Mecca and Madina and is alive and will in due course appear before the disciples. After him Baba Budan, one of his closest disciples, after whom the shrine is called now, arrived in the 17th century. He introduced coffee to this hilly region, brought from Mocha, Yemen and carried his mission further. Baba Budan's origin is usually traced to Bagdad. It is believed that he reached Chikmagalur via the western coastal towns of Malabar and Mangalore. Baba Budan was killed in an ambush near the present cave and was buried along with two other Sufis inside the cave. He is also called Hazrath Syed Meran Baba and also *Jan-e-Pak Shaheed*⁸. Although the institution of custodian of the site is traced to Dada, it began to be centralised in a single family after the death of another Sufi saint, Hazrath Syed Shah Jamaluddin, and it is still administered by the Muslim family.

In Datta Peeta/Dada Peer dargah, named after the religious figures of both religions, the syncretic culture can be seen in many ways. For example, the date for the annual saints day called *Urs* is decided on the basis of the Hindu calendar; musical instruments, like '*kombu*' (horn) and '*kahale*' (a wind instrument like a flute) which are traditionally used in Hindu Temple worship, are part of the *Urs*, Muslims and Hindus pray to both '*padukas*' (footprints) kept in the cave

supposed to be of Dattatreya and Dada Peer. Sajjade Nishin, the present custodian is called 'Swamy' (a Hindu honorific, which also means master) and also 'Sri Dattatreya Swami Baba Budan Swami Jagadguru'; worship of the *peeta* or the seat is exclusively the privilege of an unmarried man or *fakir*⁹. Traditions such as lighting the lamp, breaking the coconut in front of the gate, collecting the sandal or soil which is believed to have the power to cure, which are commonly practiced by all worshippers. Moreover, Hindus and Muslims celebrate *Datta Jayanti*¹⁰ and *Urs* every year in the same place. (However, in recent years the Hindutva organisations have been organising what is called "*shobhayatras*" (large processions) of Hindus which have been causing communal riots).

A number of syncretic practices and common cultural symbols are used during the religious celebrations by the adherents of both the communities. A large number of stories about miraculous events have been constructed around Dada's *dargah*. These stories pertain to spiritual and healing powers including the power to bestow children, relief from physical disorders, property disputes etc. There are stories about how Dada protected a princess who later came to be known as Sathi¹¹ Samyukta by the Hindus and Mama Jigni¹² by the Muslims. This and many other such sites and practices have become victims to Hindutva's 'spatial strategies', the main thrust of them being destruction of syncretic identities and construction of radicalised identities based on religious differences. The entire discourse surrounding the cultural practices of this place, has been referred to the court of law to clarify the religious rights of competing religious communities, represented by *Wakf* Board and Hindutva organisations along with the secular state, instead of treating them as unique and retaining them as ambiguous so that neither group can lay exclusive claim on the practices. This has resulted in reducing what once was a unique cult of saints with unique practices into Hindu and/or Muslim practices. By viewing every practice from specific religious categories the state and the courts have contributed to the confusion rather than promoting the retention of the syncretic nature of this place. Hence, noting the coexistence of two traditions without contention for several centuries, Hegde and Sadanand (2003)¹³ maintain that [...] the practices and objects associated with these two different stories are one and the same. The fact that multiple stories never generated disputes about the legitimate identification of the objects and practices of this shrine and instead they happily coexisted, would itself suggest

that there was no truth claims associated with such stories. They were not historical traditions of one or the other religion, recording either a conquest, or a revolt, or providing ideological foundation to the practices here. These stories are pertaining to the spiritual and healing powers of this shrine, to bestow children, relief from physical ailments, and resolutions to property disputes, which were connected with the powers of this seat, and assured the followers that such practices would provide them solace (p71).

Hence, the authors argue that understanding the nature of the place as a unique tradition would remove the claims both of the religious rights and property claims restoring the shrine to people as a place for seeking spiritual solace and healing power. However, Hindutva organisations will not be satisfied with such a coexistence of syncretic practices as their aim is to dislodge Muslim presence from the shrine and appropriate it under their spatial strategies.

HINDUTVA IDEOLOGY AND ITS FASCIST STRATEGIES

The socio-political strategies of Hindutva resemble the strategies adopted by fascists in Italy and Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.

Fascism had come to power in Italy and Germany through a combination of street violence (carefully orchestrated from above but still undeniably with great mass support), deep infiltration into the police, bureaucracy and army, and the connivance of 'centrist' political leaders (Sarkar 1993:163).

Street violence perpetrated by Hindutva cadres is an everyday feature in India during the mobilisations. It is used as a strategy to keep the sectarian politics alive, and to make sure that the secular politics should not take root. This strategy has helped the Hindutva forces to sell their agenda to the majority of Hindus by describing it as the failure of secularism in India because it hinges on appeasement of minorities.

The key features of Hindutva ideology are manifest in most of the classical fascist approaches: terrorising opponents with physical threats and attacks, destruction of property, publishing defamatory material against individuals and organisations that oppose the ideology, and infiltrating state apparatus systematically. As Sarkar argues,

Fascist ideology in Europe had combined already quite widespread, crudely nationalist, racist, and in Germany anti-Semitic, prejudices with fragments from much more sophisticated philosophies (Sarkar 1993:164-165).

Hindutva ideology is a similar weaving of philosophical and religious fragments to construct an ethnically exclusive utopia. This is done through carefully constructing an enemy (the other), who is a threat to 'our' culturally perfect Hinduness.

DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY

In post-independent India for over five decades the secular ideology espoused by the Congress party held sway and it defined the national space in economic terms. In this conception of the nation whoever contributed to the nation in any productive capacity is included as a citizen. The nation comprises patriotic producers and the 'other' is the shirker who does not want to work and produce for the nation, and the 'non-national'. This was the Nehruvian¹³ vision of India. Hence the discourse of exclusion is focussed towards outside. This was an inclusive vision as it was ideologically impartial towards various communities. In contrast, the Hindutva conception of the 'other' is focussed inside; the enemy within. By implication it refers to minorities such as Muslims and Christians (Deshpande 1995). If Muslims are suspected of shielding terrorists, Christians, through their missionary work, are suspected to be acting as stooges to Western powers. In ways typical of fascist ideologies, an enemy image of the Muslim is discursively created through the process of mobilisations and media fusing together pre-existing prejudices with the new ones. Hence,..... central to Hindutva as a mass phenomenon (or for that matter to Fascism) is the development of a powerful and extendable enemy image through appropriating stray elements from past prejudices, combining them with new ones skilfully dressed up as old verities, and broadcasting the resultant compound through the most up-to-date media techniques. The Muslim here becomes the near-exact equivalent of the Jew—or the Black (more generally, immigrants felt to be inferior for one or another reason) in contemporary White racism (Sarkar 1993:165).

In a way similar to the anti-Semitic discourse about the European Jew, the twisted logic of Hindutva alleges that the Muslim in India is privileged because of the governments' 'minority appeasement' policies. As against the interests of

majority Hindus, protection of whose interests is supposed to be the primary role of the state, Muslims are protected even when they destroy temples. They further claim that due to the legal allowance of polygamy Muslims breed faster than Hindus, despite the statistical facts being otherwise¹⁹ As a typical example of ethnocentric language the Muslims are called '*Babar ki aulad*', (the progeny of Babar, the Mughal Emperor). This alleged inheritance alone is good enough to condemn every Muslim as anti-national to the Hindutva view of the Hindu Nation.

These are the crudest ideological discourses against Muslims. But the subtle or soft varieties of Hindutva are not less fascist in tenor if one analysed the 'democracy argument' of Hindutva which claims that the Indian state should be Hindu in nature as Hindus are the majority. This argument is anti-democratic as it proposes the rule of the majority which is similar to Fascist or totalitarian regimes of one party rule. The Hindutva ideology aims to build a *Hindu Rastra* (Hindu Nation) which is its ultimate political goal. This majoritarian political objective openly intends to make all the minorities into second class citizens, an idea completely opposed to democracy which, by definition, should protect minorities and keep the option of political minorities achieving electoral majority by various kinds of alliances. However, the Hindutva conception of majoritarian rule considers the BJP as the only legitimate party to represent the Hindus and that only those who support this party are Hindus. This exclusionary logic makes it fascist in every way as it excludes everyone who does not support this ideology. The fate awaiting the minorities in India according to Hindutva ideology is expressed by Sumit Sakar (1993:166) thus: What the triumph of Hindutva, 'hard'/'soft', implies for Muslims and other minority groups is already obvious enough: a second-class citizenship at best, constant fear of riots amounting to genocide, a consequent strengthening of the most conservative and fundamentalist groups within such communities.

In order to emphasise their objective and reinforce this feeling among the minorities Hindutva forces have adopted certain spatial strategies which have succeeded in disarming the minorities discursively as well as physically. As a discursive strategy history and mythology are invoked to establish the claim while physically destroying or occupying spaces that belonged to minorities for centuries. Ever since the destruction of Babri Masjid in 1992, there have been numerous attacks on minority groups, by way of killing, destroying house and property by burning and systematically attacking destroying their communal

symbols, especially religious. The above discussed conflict about Baba Budan Giri is one example of executing this spatial strategy.

SPATIAL STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION

If the nation is conceived as a 'Holy Land' then in order to construct a 'perfect nation' for the ethnically pure community every kind of 'alien presence' requires purging. For this utopia to come about, the history of India is a stumbling-block because the country had been a 'victim' of invasions and 'desecrations'. The chief culprits here are Muslims and Christians, though Aryans themselves are invaders into this land, a fact the Hindutva historians want to contest (and twist) in order to construct themselves as 'native'. When the Muslims ruled India from the 13th century onwards and later the Europeans, they brought with them proselytising religions and they converted vast populations to their religion. In order to escape the slavery and rigidity imposed on them by the Hindu caste system many lower caste people had chosen to convert to Islam and Christianity over the centuries. Moreover, places of worship had been constructed or taken over by the invading armies, (a usual feature of warfare at the time and one practised also previously by the invading Hindu kings against the Buddhists). However, Hindutva ideologues consider these invasions as desecrations of their 'holy land', treating them as insulting to a great civilisation requiring repair. Now is the payback time for reclaiming such sites, believed to have been taken over by the invaders. This explains the special role accorded to the spatial strategies adopted and progressively implemented through multiple mobilisations. The chief among the claims is about the Babri Masjid at Ayodya in Uttar Pradesh (North India), the place claimed to be the birth place of Ram, one of the Hindu gods. As already mentioned, large scale mobilisations have succeeded in literally destroying this centuries old Mosque and erecting a temporary structure for Hindu worship. This spatial strategy is being followed through all over India by claiming rights over hundreds of sites that are subject to Muslim or Christian use.

Spatial strategies of Hindutva can be described as:

[.....] essentialisation, or an attempt to reverse the spatial logic of Nehruvianism in order to return to Savarkar's vision of the nation-space. This means that Hindutva tends to emphasise the particularity of social space by attempting to (re)invest it with a unique cultural specificity. This means pursuing an aggressive strategy for the 'Hinduisation' of India (Deshpande 1995:3223).

The tactics employed to further this objective are predominantly of three types: those disputes about *sites*, *routes* and *localities*. In the first category, multiple sites are claimed to be under dispute and hence must be belonging to Hindus. Secondly, routes designated for religious or political mobilisations that passed through minority dominated areas, claiming them to be rightful routes for Hindutva purposes as they represented the majority Hindu community, and hence, implicitly telling the minorities that they should learn to put up with majority needs. Thirdly, localities are specifically designated as Hindu, thus creating pretexts for purging them of minorities and making certain areas exclusively Hindu and hence not allowed for minorities, especially for Muslims to live there. With the successful deployment of these spatial strategies, Hindutva forces have largely succeeded in claiming legitimacy for their fascist strategies and ethnic ideologies (Deshpande 1995). These strategies are reminiscent of Nazi ideology in the 1930s followed against the Jews (Reich, 1970). With the lame-duck politics of the supposedly 'secular' Congress governments, and due to the stupendous success of the Hindutva discourses, a large portion of Indian society and the administrative apparatus has adopted the racist ideology of Hindutva as "communalised common sense" (Sarkar 1991). This soft communal violence fitted into the day-to-day Indian social fabric which is overwhelmingly unequal and racist towards various communities within the Hindu tradition itself.

This unwritten message to the minorities is practiced with considerable finesse. It is intended to generate a sense of disquiet and vulnerability among the minorities, without overt violence against them. The idea is to tell them never to cross the lines drawn by the local power structure. Be content with your reduced status; don't raise your voice or hopes (Khare 2014, Opinion).

The result of this long term strategy was able to bear political dividends in abundance in the recent national elections giving absolute majority to the BJP, the party that espouses this fascist ideology.

If these are the recent developments in India, the patterns of collective identity politics and the consequent conflicts have their roots much deeper in the social structures of the society. The forces of globalisation and the neoliberal economic order have only added further fuel to fire. Before discussing the role of these global forces, it would be useful to understand the dynamics that produce conflicts among groups that define themselves via a collective identity which is a typical feature in Indian politics.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND CONFLICT

The term collective identity refers to “a feeling of we-ness and perceived common interests in a group.[...]The shaping and reinforcement of this we-ness maintains and strengthens the collective identity” (Jensen et al 2009:9). Collective identity differs from social identity in that social identity can be attributed to individuals to help them position and orient themselves socially whereas collective identity is based on a feeling of shared perception of the self. Collective identities are expressed through “identity work” which refers to “individual and collective activities people take part in to establish and signal who they are and what they stand for, in order to identify themselves to their surroundings and to establish themselves in relation to the “other” or set of others”(Jensen et al 2009:10). This is done by employing symbolic resources such as language, dress, religious or dietary practices. By doing so, the members of such groups accentuate the differences between themselves and others. The use of such symbolic resources give “substance to the ‘real’ or imagined we-ness and collectivity”that the group tries to construct (Jensen et al 2009:10). The construction of social and collective identities always creates the binary “we” against “them” as Jensen et al (2009:13) argue:

The bottom line is that the construction of social identities always asks of the individual to take a divisive standpoint; an inclusionary standpoint to some groups is an exclusionary standpoint to other groups. These standpoints initiate the formation of in-groups and out-groups, and lay the foundation for intergroup conflict.

The process of collective identity requires elements that forge cohesiveness within groups. Often the (perceived) personality traits of the leader as well as power and prestige that the group wields are good enough factors that help group cohesiveness. With Narendra Modi and his ‘strong man’ image the BJP was able to unite disparate groups of Hindus behind their ideology, proves this argument amply. A second factor that contributes to the group cohesiveness is the ability of the group to deliver the objectives and goals it professes to achieve on behalf of its members. Having an experience of Congress ruling the country with its allies for the last ten years with severe policy paralysis and slack

economic performance, BJP is perceived to be a political party that can achieve economic development and greatness for the Hindus as a group.

As for the psychological disposition of group members one can notice a marked change towards “deindividuation” which refers to a situation where the individual pays less and less attention to his or her inner self and is more and more influenced by group norms, practices and values. This can result in losing sight of morals and values once held as important and also ignoring the consequences of one’s actions as a group member. This level of identification with the group at the expense of self-reflexiveness is at the root of mass psychological behaviour (Jensen et al 2009). The large scale mobilisations and the consequent senseless violence against Muslims bears witness to the “deindividuation” process among the Hindutva foot-soldiers who are ever ready to kill their own neighbours, rape and maim women and children and destroy the livelihoods of the poor with impunity.

Another important factor that can effectively produce group cohesiveness is a sense of victimhood. On the one hand “collective victimhood” is deployed for group cohesiveness and on the other as a discursive strategy for aggressive action towards the other. Often such a discourse is deployed to strengthen national identity, especially when the nation ventures into wars. Similar strategies are used by groups in group conflicts where group members are victims or witnesses to violence towards oneself or one’s group members. This manifests itself in the form of poor empathy towards the “others” in group members as expressed by Jensen et al (2009): “If the person has a high sense of commitment, the awareness of victimisation towards the in-group will produce the least empathy towards the out-group”(p19).

And when a conflict occurs, such group perceptions and the manner of such group cohesiveness means the violence is likely to be immense; simply because the group members do not have any empathy towards the other. This is the kind of violence one can identify in situations such as communal riots in India, tribal violence in Africa, ethnic violence in East Europe not to mention the Nazi violence towards non-Aryan populations. The racist violence of far right groups in Europe and America, Jihadi groups all over the world, and Hindu fundamentalists in India are the examples. The extreme nature of violence that such groups can produce

is evidenced in the kind of statistics of killings, rapes and mutilations of those identified as “others” by these groups (Appadurai 2006).

CONFLICT, POWER AND REPRESSIVE FORGETTING

Collective identity-related conflicts are also determinants of power relations among communities. If such conflicts acquired war proportions in the case of nations, conflicts among groups within the bounds of nation-states are power struggles for various types of dominance among identity groups. In the current context of India, the entire discourse deployed by Hindutva forces is to erase memories of a syncretic culture that has been the bedrock of Indian civilisation. And this has been carried out systematically by renaming various public sites, claiming rights over syncretic places of worship and culture, and showing intolerance to anything that questions the ideological design of Hindutva. These include assaults on arts, artists, history and social sciences. The dissenting or critiquing voices are forced to be silent through a number of coercive ways; very often through physical violence (Connerton, 2011).

Why are such identity-related conflicts so wide-spread today and still continue to spread over the globe like wild fire? Much of the Muslim world is on the verge of sectarian conflict, while Eastern Europe is a classic case of identity politics and violence. Almost every nation in the world today is forced to fight against one or the other type of identity-related violence. What causes such a spurt in identity consciousness among people who were once able to identify under the flag of a nation as one people? What has happened to the utopias of a world being a ‘global village’ which the process of globalisation is supposed to usher in? The following section focusses briefly on these questions with special reference to India.

GLOBALISATION AND PROLIFERATION OF IDENTITIES

After the Cold War a number of utopian possibilities were visualised as the potential results of globalisation to take hold of the world. The chief among them being open markets and free trade, spread and strengthening of democratic institutions along with the emergence of liberal governments, the free and democratic spread of the communications revolution through the internet and related technologies, reduction of poverty and inequality across the world, spread of freedom and openness in government, and justice for all. However, it

did not take very long before these dreams were shattered. Hence today, “only the most fundamentalist supporters of unfettered economic globalisation assume that the domino effects of free trade and high degrees of cross-national market integration and capital flow are always positive” (Appadurai 2006:2). Instead, what is more evident since the 1990s, (which coincides with the period of high globalisation), is heightened levels of violence directed at the individual as well as the societal level. Identity related conflicts of various types including wars, genocides and ethnic cleansings have coincided with the spread of globalization. There is even evidence of increased state violence against its own civilian populations to further the causes of globalisation (land acquisition for infrastructure development, and mineral extraction for private industrial use have led to large scale displacements of populations resulting in protests and state repression. A similar farmer mobilisation is under way in India today due to Modi government’s plans to change land acquisition laws). Other serious repercussions of globalisation are manifested in ethnic conflicts, rise in racism and the consequent ethnic cleansing of various kinds. This is because globalisation has been causing various kinds of uncertainties and insecurities by increasing anxiety among people. It makes them “ontologically insecure and existentially uncertain” (Kinnvall 2004:741) forcing them to embrace identities that provide them certainty and community. Religion and ethnic nationalism together claim to provide them with some certainty. However, in both cases it creates ‘others’ who are a threat to these identities and need to be defined and put in their place. In such an atmosphere, the needle of suspicion is projected on to minorities within and anyone who is perceived as different. If racism and fear of difference are the key psychological attitudes, they are expressed socially through discourses of exclusion and, often, through outright violence.

NATION-STATE AND ITS ETHNIC NATURE

Generally speaking religious identities are exclusionary and foster rigid collective identities as do caste identities in India. If the Semitic religions have extreme fundamentalist possibilities, such radical identity markers are not so pronounced in Hinduism or Buddhism. However, recent developments in India and Srilanka show that even these most syncretic religious traditions are embracing fundamentalist collective identity positions and further their causes through violence. The other collective identity that provides security to people is

nationalism. However, globalisation has destabilised the borders to such an extent that nation states have lost much of their power to determine the economic well-being of their citizens. As a result all that is left in the armour of the nation-state is cultural nationalism which falls back on the ethnic elements of national peoplehood. This poses serious problems to multicultural societies such as India where minorities form a substantial part of the population (nearly 20%). Hence, one needs:

[...] to recognise that there is a fundamental, and dangerous, ideal behind the very idea of the modern nation-state, the idea of a 'national ethnos'. No modern nation, however benign its political system and however eloquent its public voices may be about the virtues of tolerance, multiculturalism, and inclusion, is free of the idea that its national sovereignty is built on some sort of ethnic genius (Appadurai 2006:3).

In the face of globalisation and its effects this exclusivist and racist monster of ethno-nationalism is on the rise everywhere. However, nations claiming to be ethnic entities are an achievement with great costs, borne especially by minorities. Today's search for national identities are but a redeployment of discourses and political projects once achieved "through histories of war and sacrifice, through punishing disciplines of educational and linguistic uniformity, and through the subordination of myriad local and regional traditions to produce Indians or Frenchmen or Britons or Indonesian" (Appadurai 2006:4). To achieve the ideals of utopian ethnic nationalism, as propagated by the Hindutva ideologues in India today, they need to look on to Nazi Germany. That is where this utopian ideology of ethnic nationalism leads to as Appadurai suggests: "the road from national genius to a totalised cosmology of the sacred nation, and further to ethnic purity and cleansing, is relatively direct..... All nations, under some conditions, demand whole-blood transfusions, usually requiring some part of their blood to be extruded"(Appadurai 2006:4). Such ideologies cannot tolerate the presence of minorities and dissenters. Smaller the minority, worse will be the hatred and harsher the means of elimination as shown by the Nazis.

This is evident in various ethnic conflicts of the 1990s where the typical characteristic of violence is surplus rage and excess of hatred producing unimaginable forms of "degradation and violation, both to the body and the being of the victim"(10). This could be considered as semantics of postmodern

violence. In this form of violence the minor differences are the most intolerable and call for elimination. These minor differences are seen as hindrances to achieving perfect identities which are 'just a step' away but for these minorities. But the minorities are just a symptom where difference itself is the problem. However, given the nature of the present world, despite all the power and strategies at their disposal, majorities are totally helpless to achieve what they want and hence, greater the frustration and more brutal the violence. As Appadurai (2006:11) puts it:

In these circumstances, the rage and fear that incompleteness and uncertainty together produce can no longer be addressed by the mechanical extinction or extrusion of unwanted minorities. Minority is the symptom but difference itself is the underlying problem. Thus the elimination of difference itself (not just the hyper-attachment to minor differences) is the new hallmark of today's large-scale, predatory narcissisms. Since the elimination of difference itself is fundamentally impossible in a world of blurred boundaries, mixed marriages, shared languages, and other deep connectivities, it is bound to produce an order of frustration that can begin to account for the systematic excess that we see in today's headlines.

If the above generally holds good for all societies, in the case of India the above issues are orchestrated by its recent economic development and the consequent feelings of 'civilisational greatness' which is being exhibited by taking recourse to archaic Hindu traditions and practices, especially by the rising middle classes. In some sense globalisation has produced a proliferation of identities competing against one another for economic and cultural dominance. However, in the Indian context the ideology of Hindutva has been successful in assimilating these identities under its Vedic hegemony through the deployment of a classic majoritarian 'predatory identity' (Appadurai 2006). Such hegemonic power has been used, on the one hand to consolidate its position as the sole representative of Hindu interests led by the upper castes, while at the same time, co-opting various lower caste groups and using them as foot soldiers to execute communal programmes against the minorities.

In order to justify their ideology of exclusion and fascism Hindutva ideologues have used the 'victimhood' motif very effectively, so that internally and internationally they could find legitimacy for their ethnic cleansing programmes.

Taking shelter under the motif of “Hindu hurt” due to the invasions and colonial rule of the past, they have tried to justify their aggression against minorities in India and have tried to neutralise international opprobrium, effectively managing to reconfigure political identities (Mukta, 2000). Given the post 9/11 discourse in the world media against Muslims, Hindutva forces in India have found many ideological friends among the conservatives the world over and this has emboldened them in their ideology of hatred and violence, executing the spatial strategies of erasure of collective memory.

CONCLUSION

Memory is a group experience and every recollection by individuals and groups is constituted through collective frameworks. Memories belong to life and lived experience. India as a civilisation is a fusion and syntheses of many indigenous, migrant and invading cultures. The non-authoritarian nature of various Indian traditions found something good in every new culture and tried to integrate it to enhance a way of life which already had been built and had survived through many centuries of intercourse between cultures. This is the strength of a civilisation that can function as the largest democracy in the world having over 1.2 billion people.

This long tradition of tolerance and assimilation has been shattered by several interventions that have been fundamentalist and fascist in nature, propagated by both Hindus and Muslims, over the centuries. However, it is the resilience and wisdom shown by the ordinary Indians that have been successful in defeating those anti-human ideologies as Sarkar (1991:166) observes:

In India, as in other countries with multiple religious traditions, the need for and therefore the bases of co-existence are broader and deeper than the teachings of the vast majority of holy men of all creeds or the policies of many kings, among whom Akbar is only the best remembered. They have been grounded in the necessities of daily existence itself, which might occasionally produce conflict, but also tend towards the restoration of interdependence—if allowed to do so by organised communal forces, which means less and less often nowadays

Baba Budangiri is one such symbol which is constantly under attack and is constantly struggling to maintain itself as a site of multicultural living. It is here that collective memory is attacked and denied its legitimate force. The forces of

darkness are trying to erase this collective memory, which is a symbol of 'Indianness'. This is also a test of whether or not collective memory can withstand the forces of darkness and their forced version of history.

Notes

¹ By metropolitan capital Muzaffer Assadi (2002) refers to capital flowing to Coastal Karnataka due people's links with larger cities, such as Mumbai, within India, and from the Gulf Countries where a large number of people from the Coastal Karnataka are employed.

²*Dargah* is a *Persian* origin word that refers to a *SufiIslamicshrine* built over the grave of a revered religious figure, often a *Sufi* saint which Muslims may visit to perform a practice called visiting a grave (*ziyarat*).

³*Peetha* refers to a seat. In Hindu religious tradition they are places of worship or learning.

⁴Arathi (in Kannada language), or aarthi (a word of Sanskrit origin) refers to a Hindu religious ritual in which light from wicks soaked in ghee or camphor is offered to deities.

⁵Here, one needs to remember, that Indian Muslims are converts to Islam from various Hindu castes. Often due to the oppressive Brahminic caste ideology within Hinduism where one's social position is determined by birth alone, and hence, no one could change one's caste bondage by remaining within the Hindu tradition, many lower caste people had converted to Islam, Christianity and Buddhism. That also explains why most Indian Muslims and Christians are culturally, perfect Indians despite following Islam and Christianity. However, according to Hindutva ideology they do not fall under the definition of being 'Hindu'. More about this issue is discussed later.

⁶Special way of washing exposed body parts as a preparation for prayers in Islam.

⁷Refers to 'pure soul' according to Islamic belief.

⁸Muslim Sufi ascetic also refers to Hindu wandering ascetics.

⁹The birth day of Datta Swamy

¹⁰Sathi refers to a woman who, according to the requirements of some Indian caste traditions, immolates herself on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband. Such a woman is honoured in some Indian traditions.

¹¹According to some Islamic traditions it means a woman disciple of Dada Kalander, who attained high spiritual grace

¹²For a detailed discussion about the nature of the dispute, state interventions, court rulings and the discourses surrounding the dispute refer to (Hegde & Sadanand, 2013)

¹³Jawaharlal Nehru was the first prime minister of India after Independence.

The Report on the Status of Women in India (1975), however, had found the rate of polygamy actually higher among Hindus than Muslims (5.06 per cent as against 4.31 per cent) (Sarkar 1991).

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INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

- Ramesh Salian

Abstract

This paper develops an argument that the main determinants of differences in development of the nations and well being of people across the world are due to differences in functioning and composition of political and economic institutions. Reforming these institutions will solve problems of development. But reforming these institutions is a tedious task, because, economic institutions are controlled by the political institutions and in a country like India, economic institutions of society depend on the nature of political institutions and spread of political power in society. This paper is an attempt to discuss the most debated and disturbing questions before the world. Why are some countries poorer than others? Why are some countries richer than others? Why are social and health indicators exciting in developed nations and worrisome in developing countries? In this paper the economic performance of India and South Korea, two 'Asian Miracle' Nation's has been discussed and the author concludes that, economic systems adopted by various economies of the world have shaped their image, strength and competitiveness globally and those who failed are still struggling to do so.

KEY WORDS: *competitiveness, Economic Development, Institutions, political choice, poverty*

INTRODUCTION

Human rights are violated not only by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that create huge inequalities- 'rightly' said by Pope Francis 1 (quoted in WDR, 2014). Widening economic and social inequalities are the root cause for global human disasters. It is a great sense of concern for the thinkers, policymakers at national and international level. World Development Report 2014 emphasizes that, "economic, social and environmental shocks have a major impact on people's lives and are a key challenge to sustaining and advancing human development". Progressive institutional set up is only way for sustainable development in the world.

Dr Ramesh Salian, Assistant Professor, Department of Studies and Research in Economics, Tumkur University, Tumakuru. Email: salianramesh@hotmail.com

Globally institutional participation, constructive and successive efforts made by various responsible nations of the world have reshaped economic and social well being of most people in most countries of the world. Innovations and advances made in technology, education and income and its proper utilisation at micro and macro level has held ever-greater promise for longer, healthier, more secure lives (Salian, 2015).

INSTITUTIONS: MEANING AND IMPORTANCE

Famous institutional economist Douglass North in his book *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of many economies of the world. According to him "institutions exist to reduce uncertainty in the world. In a world without institutions we would not know how to deal with each other. Institutions are the incentive systems that structure human interaction. They can make predictable our dealings with each other every day in all kinds of forms and shapes. They thereby not only reduce uncertainty in the world but allow us to get on with everyday business and solve problems effectively. He further argues, "Some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnations". In his opinion institutions create the incentive structure in an economy and organisations will be created to take advantages of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework (Douglaus North, 1990 p. 1).

Douglass North (1990, p. 3) offers the following definition: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. According to D. North, organisations include political bodies (political parties, senate, a city council, a regulatory agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family firms, cooperatives), and educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational training centres). They are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. Modelling organisations are analysing governance structures, skills and how learning by doing will determine the organisation's success over time. Both what organisations come into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework". Three important features of institutions are apparent in this definition: (1) that they are "humanly devised," which contrasts with other potential fundamental

causes, like geographic factors, which are outside human control; (2) that they are "the rules of the game" setting "constraints" on human behaviour; (3) that their major effect will be through incentives (Daron and Robinson, 2008, p 2).

World Economic Forum's Global Competitive Index 2014-15 examined the institutional performance of 140 economies of the world and ranked them accordingly. The WEF's report highlights the role of institutions in the economic development of the nations in the following words. "The institutional environment is determined by the legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms and governments interact to generate wealth. The quality of institution influences investment decisions and the organisation of production and plays a key role in the ways in which societies distribute the benefits and bear the costs of development strategies and policies. The role of institutions goes beyond the legal framework. Government attitudes toward markets and freedoms and the efficiency of its operations are also very important. Excessive bureaucracy and red tape, over-regulation corruption, dishonesty and trustworthiness, inability to provide appropriate services for the business sector and political dependences of the judicial system to impose significant economic costs to businesses and slow the process of economic development" (GCR1, 2014-15, pp 4-6).

INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND INEQUALITIES

"Without effective institutions, poor people and poor countries are excluded from the benefits of markets" once said the World Bank Chief Economist and Senior Vice President Nicholas Stern. The importance of an institution in progressive nation building has been highlighted in the World Development Report, 2014. The report says "high achievements on critical aspects of human development, such as health and nutrition, can quickly be undermined by a natural disaster or economic slump. Theft and assault can leave people physically and psychologically impoverished. Corruption and unresponsive state institutions can leave those in need of assistance without recourse. Political threats, community tensions, violent conflict, neglect of public health, environmental damages, crime and discrimination all add to individual and community vulnerability" (WDR, 2014).

Institutional breakdown is the major cause for human depression and sufferings. Globalisation has brought countries together and provided new opportunities. Many institutions enjoyed the fruits of the globalisation. But there is also a widespread

sense of unevenness in the world today in livelihoods, personal security, in the environment and in global politics due to the institutional failure in some countries of the world. Complex and inefficient institutions are a common problem, especially for poor people in poor countries. In Mozambique, for example, registering a new business requires 19 steps and five months, and costs more than the average annual income per capita. By contrast, registering a new business in Australia requires only two steps, two days, and two percent of the average annual income per capita. In Slovenia, resolving a dispute over a returned check can take up to four years; in Singapore it takes just 35 days (WDR, 2002). Djankov et al. found that, while the total cost of opening a medium-size business in the United States was less than 0.02 percent of GDP per capita in 1999, the same cost was 2.7 percent of GDP per capita in Nigeria, 1.16 percent in Kenya, 0.91 percent in Ecuador, and 4.95 percent in the Dominican Republic. These entry barriers are highly correlated with various economic outcomes, including the rate of economic growth and the level of development (Salian, 2015).

Nevertheless, this type of correlation does not establish that the countries with worse institutions are poor because of their institutions. After all, the developed nations differ from Nigeria, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic in social, geographic, cultural, and economic fundamentals, so these may be the source of their poor economic performance. In fact, these differences may be the source of institutional differences themselves (Daron & James).

The following statistics, figures were obtained from World Development Report, 2014, World Health Statistics, 2014, Millenniums Development Goal, 2014 and Report of the Global Competitiveness Index, 2014 for the purpose of analysis. The below analysis given clearly shows the institutional failure in many countries in the world and gives insights to the policy makers and global stakeholders to stress the need for an effective, constructive and responsible institution for the betterment of the human beings.

Human Development Report 2014 estimated that more than 1.5 billion people (about a fifth of the world's population) live in countries affected by conflict. About 45 million people were forcibly displaced due to conflict or persecution by the end of 2012-the higher in 18 years-more than 15 million of them refugees. Today, only 20 percent of people worldwide have adequate social security coverage, and over 50

percent lack any type of social security. Globally, 1.2 billion people (22 percent) live on less than \$1.25 a day. Increasing the income poverty line to \$2.50 a day raises the global income poverty rate to about 50 percent, or 2.7 billion people. Moving the poverty line in this way draws in a large number of people who are potentially vulnerable to poverty and reduced circumstances. In South Asia, 44.4 percent of the population, around 730 million people, live on \$1.25-\$2.50 a day (HDR 2014).

Despite recent progress in poverty reduction, more than 2.2 billion people are either near or living in multidimensional poverty. That means more than 15 percent of the world's people remain vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. At the same time, nearly 80 percent of the global population lacks comprehensive social protection. About 12 percent (842 million) suffer from chronic hunger, and nearly half of all workers-more than 1.5 billion-are in informal or precarious employment (HDR, 2014).

Table 1. Top five countries with the largest share of the global extreme poor, 2010 (%)

India	32.9
China	12.8
Nigeria	8.9
Bangladesh	5.0
Congo	5.0
Other Countries	35

Source WDR, 2014

Institutional failure further deteriorates the well being of common people in the world. The World Health Organization (2014) estimates that about 4,400 people die every day because of intentional acts of violence. Poverty and social exclusion are problems for those who are aging, especially because roughly 80 percent of the world's older population does not have a pension and relies on labour and family for income. Worldwide, more than 46 percent of people aged 60 and older live with a disability, and whether living with a disability or not, 15-30 percent of older people live alone or with no adult of working age. In 2012 there were 37,941 conflict-related deaths worldwide from 41 conflicts.

Table 2 shows the maternal mortality rate (per Lakh), life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate (per 1000), birth attended by skilled health personnel, availability of safe and improved drinking water and sanitation and availability of physicians per 10000 people. It is clear from the above table that health indicators are most favourable to the nations that are well off and worse off to lower or middle income nations. It is, due the consistent efforts of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals many poor or developing nations have shown overwhelming improvement in their health.

Table 2. Global Health Indicators-2014

Income Group	MMR	LE	IMR (1000)	Birth attended by skilled health Personal(%)	Improved Drinking water (%)	Improved sanitation (%)	Physicians (10000)
Low Income	450	62	56	46	69	37	2.4
Lower Middle Income	240	66	46	64	88	48	7.8
Upper Middle Income	57	74	16	95	93	74	15.5
High Income	17	79	5	99	99	96	29.4
Global	210	70	35	72	90	64	14.1

MMR-Maternal Mortality Rate, LE-Life Expectancy, IMR-Infant Mortality Rate.

Source: World Health Statistics (WHO) 2014.

Table 3 explains the life expectancy of the people and its correlation with institutional performance in 10 developed or progressive nations of the world. It is clear from the table that, except Italy all other countries' institutional performance closely correlates with life expectancy of the people. Life expectancy of male and female in rich or developed nations is above 80 years as per the WHO report 2014. Meanwhile, these nations are positioned under top 50 institutional performers of

the world economies, according to the survey made by the World Economic Forum in 2014-15.

Table 3. Highest positive differences between Life Expectancy and Institutional Performance in some selected Developed Nations

Institutional Ranking**(144)	Country*	Life Expectancy* (Male)	Institutional Ranking(144)	Country	Life Expectancy (Female)
31	Iceland	81.2	25	Japan	87.0
5	Switzerland	80.7	42	Spain	85.1
17	Australia	80.5	5	Switzerland	85.1
36	Israel	80.2	1	Singapore	85.1
1	Singapore	80.2	54	Italy	85.0
9	New Zealand	80.2	26	France	84.9
54	Italy	80.2	17	Australia	84.6
25	Japan	80.0	20	Rep. Korea	84.6
12	Sweden	80.0	7	Luxemburg	84.1
7	Luxemburg	79.7	41	Portugal	84.0

Source: *World Health Statistics, 2014, WHO. ** Global Competitive Index, 2014-15.

The lowest regional HDI values are in Sub-Saharan Africa (0.502) and South Asia (0.588), and the highest is for Latin America and the Caribbean (0.740), followed closely by Europe and Central Asia (0.738). The very high human development group—as measured by the HDI—has a value of 0.890, considerably higher than that of the medium and low human development groups. The 85 richest people in the world have the same wealth as the 3.5 billion poorest people. Between 1990 and 2010 income inequality in developing countries rose 11 percent. Inequality in health and education has been declining, but remains high, particularly in some regions. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest inequality in health outcomes, and South Asia has the highest inequality in education. Inequality is a considerable threat to human development, particularly because it reflects the inequality of opportunity (HDR, 2014).

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

"In a country well governed, poverty is something to be ashamed of. In a country badly governed, wealth is something to be ashamed of". (Confucius Principle, quoted in HDR, 2014, p. 82). Globalization and access to worldwide market has brought countries together and provided new opportunities for their development and growth. Some countries effectively grabbed the opportunities provided by the globalised world by reforming their political and economic institutions, where as some countries' institutions stick to their age-old policies and remain vulnerable in economic and social development.

Economic institutions differ across countries As per the new UN classifications countries with less than \$1,035 GNI per capita are classified as low-income countries, those with \$1,036 to \$4,085 as lower middle income countries, between \$4,086 and \$12,615 as upper middle income countries, and those with incomes of more than 12,615 as high-income countries(see United Nations country classifications). Table 4 depicts the relationship among some key factors of economic growth, such as GDP per Capita, GDP, countries, global competitive index rank and role of institutions of some of developed and developing economies.

It is clear from the above table that countries with high ranking in institutional performance have also had higher sides of per capita income and competitiveness. Countries with lower income have lower competitive index ranking and institutional performance ranking. It is appropriate to quote Human Development Report 2014 on Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience, "Yet some people are much more vulnerable than others. And in many cases discriminatory social norms and institutional shortcomings exacerbate this vulnerability, leaving certain groups without the household, community and state support needed to boost their coping capacities, and these groups and the institutions and norms that weaken their capabilities and restrict their choices".

Table 4. Positive and Negative differences between GDP, GDP Per capita, Global Competitive Index Ranking and Role of Institution in some of the Developed and Developing Economics in 2014.

Country	GDP Per Capital(US\$)	GDP(US\$ billions)	Global Competitive Index Rank/144	Role of Institution/144
Australia	64.863	1505.3	22	19
Bangladesh	904	141.3	109	131
Brazil	11.311	2242.9	57	97
Cambodia	1016	15.7	95	119
Canada	51990	1825.1	15	14
China	6747	9181.4	28	47
Denmark	59191	331.0	13	16
Germany	3636.0	44.999	5	17
Hong Kong	37777	273.7	7	8
India	1506	1870.7	71	70
Japan	38491	4901.5	6	11
Korea South	24329	1221.8	26	82
Libya	11046	67.6	126	142
Malaysia	10548	312.4	20	20
Mexico	10630	1258.5	61	102
Mozambique	543	15.3	133	127
New Zealand	40481	181.3	17	1
Pakistan	1308	238.7	129	123
Russia	14819	2118.0	53	97
Uganda	626	23.1	122	115
UAE	43.876	396.2	12	7
UK	39567	2535.8	9	12
US	53101	16799.7	3	30
Venezuela	12147	374.0	131	144

Source: Global Competitive Index, 2014-15.

THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA

World Development Report 2002 points out that "whether a particular institution is appropriate in a country depends on supporting institutions, available technology and skills, the level of corruption, and the costs of accessing and maintaining the institution". It is true in the case of two Korean independent nations. Both South and North Korea had been one nation before the Korean war of 1950-1953. The North became the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the control of Kim Il Sung. These two independent countries organized themselves in very different ways and adopted completely different sets of institutions. The North followed the model of Soviet socialism and the Chinese Revolution in abolishing private property of land and capital. Economic decisions were not mediated by the market, but by the communist state. The South instead maintained a system of private property and the government, especially after the rise to power of Park Chung Hee in 1961 and attempted to use markets and private incentives in order to develop the economy. Before this "natural experiment" in institutional change, North and South Korea shared the same history and cultural roots. In fact, Korea exhibited an unparalleled degree of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, geographic and economic homogeneity (Daron, Simon and James, 2005).

By the late 1960's South Korea was transformed into one of the Asian "miracle" economies, experiencing one of the most rapid surges of economic prosperity in history while North Korea stagnated. By 2000 the level of income in South Korea was \$16,100 while in North Korea it was only \$1,000. By 2000 the South had become a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the rich nations' club, while the North had a level of per-capita income about the same as a typical sub-Saharan African country (Daron, Simon and James, 2005).

The economy of South Korea is multiple times (36.7 times as per current figures) that of North Korea's in terms of GDP. According to 2013 figures, the GDP of North Korea is estimated at \$33 billion, while that of South Korea is \$1.19 trillion. The GDP per capita is \$33,200 (in PPP) in South Korea, while it is \$1,800 in the North, according to the CIA World Fact book. South Korea's trade volume was a gigantic \$1.07 trillion in 2013. By comparison, North Korea reported a relatively minuscule \$7.3 billion. While North Korea runs a huge trade deficit and exports (goods and services) play an important role in South Korea's growth story (Prableen Bajpai).

The sector-wise contribution to GDP of agriculture, industry, and services is 23.4 percent, 47.2 percent, and 29.4 percent respectively in North Korea and 6.9 percent, 23.6 percent, and 69.4 percent in South Korea (CIA World Fact book figures). Some well-known South Korean brands are Samsung Electronics, HK Hynix, Samsung Life Insurance, LG Chem, Hyundai Mobis, KIA Motors, POSCO, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Shinham Financial Group, and Hyundai Motors. Geographically, the two nations are similar, but the population of North Korea (24.54 million) is half of that of South (50.22 million).

Table 5: Comparative Statement of South Korea and North Korea's GDP Growth Rate

South Korea		North Korea	
Year	GDP growth Rate (%)	Year	GDP Growth Rate (%)
1965-70	10.4	1990	-3.7
1971-80	9.1	1991	-3.5
1986	11.2	1992	-6.0
1987	12.5	1993	-4.2
1988	11.9	1994	-1.8
1991	10.4	1995	-4.6
1992	5.4	1996	-3.7
1995	8.9	1997	-6.3
2000	8.9	1999	6.2
2011	3.7	2000	1.3
2013	2.8	2012	1.3

Source: http://www.kotra.co.kr/main/info/nk/research/etc_22.php3, World Economic Outlook, 2015.

Table 6: GDP Per Capita of South Korea from 1980-2015 in Current Prices (\$US)

Year	GDP Per Capita
1980	1704.5
1990	6516.3
2000	11947.6
2005	18657.5
2010	22151.2
2014	28100.7
2015	28338.2

Source: Ivan Kolesnikov, available at <http://knoema.com/tbocwag/gdp>, derived from World Economic Outlook 2015, IMF.

The chronic food shortage in North Korea has resulted in undernourishment among the people, especially children. North Koreans tend to be smaller than their counterparts in South Korea. Even the life expectancy is lower in North Korea by ten years (69.2 years vs. 79.3 years in South Korea). The infant mortality rate in South Korea is 4.08 per 1,000 live births, while it shoots up to 26.21 in North Korea in 2012. (2012 figures) (Prableen Bajpai).

There is only one plausible explanation for the radically different economic experiences on the two Koreas after 1950: their very different institutions led to divergent economic outcomes. In this context, it is noteworthy that the two Koreas not only shared the same geography, but also the same culture (Daron, Simon and James, 2005).

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND INDIAN ECONOMY

Between 1950 and 1990, India's growth rate averaged less than 4 per cent per annum and this was at a time when the developing world, including Sub-Saharan Africa and other least developed countries, showed a growth rate of 5.2 % per annum. India, the second most populous country in the world, adopted a new economic policy in 1990. This major institutional change made by the political institution in India over the years changed its entire economic scenario. Apart from the moderate functioning of the economic institutions and the political institutions, after 1991, India' economic growth is astonishing and appreciated by the major industrial economies of the world. Today India has earned the seventh place in the top ten GDPs of the world (in current prices) and third place in the top ten GDPs of the world in \$PPP estimation (Table 7).

According to the World Economic Outlook, 2015, World Bank Data 2014 India's GDP crossed over \$2 trillion mark in 2014. It is interesting to note that India took 60 years to reach the \$1 trillion marks, India added the next 1 trillion in just seven years. The world Bank Data 2014 shows that Indian GDP Per capita rose to \$ 1610 a year (in atlas method) during 2014 from \$1506 the previous year (the Hindu).

Table 7: World's Top GDPs in terms of Current Prices and PPP Dollars in 2015 (US\$)

Rank	Country	GDP, current prices, US\$	Rank	Country	GDP, current PPP Dollars
1	United States	18125	1	China	18976
2	China	11212	2	United States	18125
3	Japan	4210	3	India	7997
4	Germany	3413	4	Japan	4843
5	United Kingdom	2853	5	Germany	3815
6	France	2470	6	Russia	3458
7	India	2308	7	Brazil	3259
8	Brazil	1504	8	Indonesia	2840
9	Italy	1843	9	United Kingdom	2641
10	Canada	1615	10	France	2634

Source: Ivan Kolesnikov, available at <http://knoema.com/tbocwag/gdp-by-country-1980-2014>, derived from World Economic Outlook 2015, IMF.

Despite its tremendous performance of economic and political institutions, India continues to suffer from poverty, malnutrition, health and primary education. Global Competitive Index 2015 appreciating India's immense potential and promise also has concern on its debacle on many issues. It states that "a third of its population still lives in extreme poverty-possibly the highest incidence of outside sub-Saharan Africa-and many people still lack access to basic services and opportunities, such as sanitation, healthcare, and quality of schooling. Improving the standard of living of the Indian population will require the country to accelerate its growth. The health situation is indeed alarming: infant mortality and malnutrition incidence are among the highest in the world; only 36 per cent of the population have access to improved sanitation; and life expectancy is Asia's second shortest, after Myanmar" (GCI, 2015, p.11).

Table 8: India's GDP and Real GDP Growth from 1980 to 2015

Year	GDP, Current prices, billion SUS	GDP, Current PPP Dollars billion	Real GDP Growth
1980	181.4	386.2	5.3
1990	326.6	997.7	5.5
2000	476.6	2100.7	4.0
2005	834.2	3273.8	9.3
2006	949.1	3687.0	9.3
2007	1238.7	4156.1	9.8
2010	1708.5	5370.6	10.3
2011	1843.0	5845.4	6.6
2012	1835.8	6252.7	5.1
2013	1875.2	6783.7	6.9
2015	2049.5	7375.9	7.2
2015 (April)	2308.0	7996.6	7.5

Source: Ivan Kolesnikov, available at <http://knoema.com/tbocwag/gdp>, derived from World Economic Outlook 2015, IMF.

Adding to this the socioeconomic and caste census, 2011 released by the Government of India reveals that 30 per cent of rural households are landless and derive a major portion of their income from manual labour and casual labour. One in three rural households is landless. 90.3 per cent of the rural family members are without a salaried job and 25.7 per cent of the India's rural population was the below poverty line in 2011-12, with an income below Rs 816 per capita per month (The Hindu).

India needs to be more progressive and assertive to reform its political institution. Being a world's largest democracy India's political choice and political power has the ability to strengthen its economic institution. Strong willpower of India's political institution to support the economic institutions will certainly make the country as a global economic power by 2030.

CONCLUSION

It is more meaningful to quote World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets that "weak institutions, tangled laws, corrupt courts, deeply biased credit systems, and elaborate business regulations, hurt poor people and hinder development". Further, the report states that "countries that systematically deal with such problems and create new institutions suited to local needs can dramatically increase income and reduce poverty. There are opportunities today that can make the transformation not only plausible but very affordable. We live in an era where rapid technological change, especially empowered by the information revolution, is deepening the integration of the world economy, changing the structure of jobs, offering new economic opportunities for all countries, facilitating green growth and enabling many low-income countries to leapfrog through economic transformation". The reason for poor institutional performances is political preference, political influence and economic decision making. There are examples in the analysis that Institutional equilibrium that comprises economic institutions and political institutions definitely empower the nations and eradicate its grass root level problems (eg: South Korea and India). Whatever may be political or economic idealism, by watching people's sufferings, exploitations, poverty, and much carnage in socialism, dictatorship, it is found, economic and political institutions that follow free market economy is good or acceptable.

ENDNOTES

1. World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report provides an overview of the competitive performance of the 144 economies of the world and it contains a detailed profile of each of the economies. Science, 2005, the World Economic Forum has based its competitive analysis on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a tool that measures the microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness. To measure the competitiveness of each nation 12 static and dynamic components used and these components are considered as pillars of

competitiveness. These components are: institutions; infrastructure ; macroeconomic environment; health and primary education; higher education and training; goods market efficiency; labour market efficiency, financial market development; technological readiness; market size; business sophistication and innovation. (see <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/>).

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RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY IN ORGANIC AND INORGANIC PADDY PRODUCTION IN HILLY ZONE OF SHIMOGA DISTRICT OF KARNATAKA: A FARM LEVEL ANALYSIS

- E. THIPPESWAMY

Abstract

In this study, an attempt has been made to analyze the resource use efficiency at farm level between organic and inorganic paddy production in hilly zone of shimoga district of Karnataka. This district has been credited with organic farmers whose achievement in organic paddy cultivation is of state level reputation. The estimates are purely based on the field survey conducted in the district during 2010-11. Results of the study reveal that the middle age farmers are in favour of organic farming in Shimoga district. The majority of respondents belonging to forward community are following the organic farming and hence the adoption of organic farming is mainly depending upon the caste of the respondents. Considerably, higher percentage of inorganic farmers are having primary school education. Therefore, farmers who have higher education would adopt the organic farming methods in farm practices. Further, the study found that the production elasticities of labour as well as plant nutrients are positive but less than unity showing the diminishing marginal productivity with respect to labour and plant nutrients both in the organic and inorganic paddy. MVP of plant nutrients is slightly less than one in organic as well as inorganic paddy besides MVP of labour is greater than one in organic as well as inorganic paddy production. In HZ, majority of the organic farmers neglect plant protection measures with the belief that the organic crop is not susceptible to pest and disease and only few most efficient organic farmers have taken plant protection measures. At the existing level of PPM application MVP of PPM is greater than its MFC indicating the scope for the use of additional quantity of PPM.

Key words: Organic farming System, Inorganic farming System, Plant protection measures, Marginal value of product and Marginal factor cost.

Dr E. Thippeswamy: Associate Professor of Economics, Field Marshal K.M.Cariappa College, Madikeri-571201, Kodagu (D) Karnanataka. **Email:**ethippeswamy@yahoo.com

INTRODUCTION

Paddy is one of the staple foodgrains for more than two-third of the population of India. Intensive paddy production is associated with high consumption of irrigational water and fertilisers. In most developing countries, farmers know well the need to allocate the given resources and the technologies at their disposal to maximize production and achieve the maximum economic efficiency. Paddy is also the major food crop in Karnataka state. Paddy production is carried out with certain inputs or resources that enhance its productivity. The extent to which this productivity can be affected by these inputs depends on how the inputs are used. For instance, when a piece of land is being cultivated, its productivity will depend on the resources that are applied to it, but more importantly on how these resources are used or applied. It is widely recognized that the improvement of agricultural productivity is critical for raising the economic growth in general and economic conditions of the farmers in particular in the state of Karnataka, where agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for more than 60 percent of the population. Thus, the efficient use of resources has to do with the amount to be applied to the land in terms of quantities and their prices (Fred Nimoh¹, 2012). It is difficult to estimate the efficiency of the farmers without the knowledge of the conditions under which the production is performed. To achieve maximum profit in a resource-constrained production environment, the farmers have to be price-responsive (Suresh¹ and Keshava Reddy, 2006). The efficiency associated with allocation of inputs according to the prevailing market price is called allocative efficiency of the farmers. Even if the farmers are allocatively efficient, they may not be realising the technically feasible maximum production due to inefficient management of the resources. In such cases, a comparison of output in relation to the level of inputs-used will reveal the true picture of efficiency. This is referred to as technical efficiency. Efficiency is an important concept in production economics when resources are constrained and opportunities of adopting better technologies are competitive (Gaddi et al., 2002). In this background, this study examines the resource use efficiency in organic and inorganic paddy production in hilly zone of Shimoga district of Karnataka and it is a farm level analysis.

Organic paddy is one of the important foodgrains consumed in Karnataka and this is evident in recent days with many farmers switching over from inorganic paddy farming to organic paddy farming in the state and Shimoga district in particular.

Organic paddy production in Shimoga district is mainly concentrated in the hilly zone and provides income to farmers and all other stakeholders involved in production and marketing. Resources used in any production activity are regarded as the input that drives the production process. In organic paddy farming, the resources required include the seeds, land, labour, capital and organic fertilizer. A resource or input is said to be efficiently utilized when it is put to the best use possible and at minimum cost allowable. In this context, this study seeks to describe the socio-economic conditions of organic and inorganic farmers in the district, and estimate the farm production function of organic and inorganic paddy with a view of deriving the marginal factor productivity to estimate how efficiently the organic and inorganic paddy farmers in the district are using their resources.

STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGY

Hilly Zone (HZ) of the district forms about 68 percent of the landmass in Shimoga district and it is an important zone where organic paddy production is done for self-consumption and to some extent for marketing also. A wide variety of organic paddy crops are grown due to the suitable climatic conditions. The crops produced include fruits (e.g. pineapple, banana and mango), Vegetables (e.g. tomatoes, chilly and cabbage), and staples like paddy and maize. However, the district is known for organic paddy in Karnataka state. The Shimoga district falls in two agro-climatic zones viz STZ (Southern Transition Zone and HZ (Hilly Transition Zone). Paddy is a major crop in both the zones. It accounts for 59.7 per cent of total cropped area during 2011-12 in HZ (Shimoga District at a Glance, 2009). Hilly zone has been taken for study where fertilizers and pesticides are leaching out the nearby water bodies during rainy season when rivers and streams are often flowing through the paddy fields. Hence, many farmers are switching over from inorganic paddy farming to organic farming in the district.

Hilly zone of the district consists of four taluks viz Thirthally, Hosanagar, Sagar and Sorab. From each taluk, 30 organic paddy farmers are selected randomly and to compare the resource use efficiency 30 inorganic paddy farmers are also selected from the same village where organic paddy farmers were selected. In this process, 240 sample paddy growing respondents have been selected in the study area. Of these 240 respondents, 120 organic and 120 inorganic paddy growing farmers were selected for the study.

2.1. The Estimation of Resource Use Efficiency

The efficiency in the use of each resource or input was judged on the basis of Marginal Value Product (MVP) of a rupee spent on the respective input. The Cobb-Douglas production function of the following specification was estimated separately for organic and inorganic paddy:

$$Y = a S^{b_1} N^{b_2} P^{b_3} L^{b_4} e^u \quad \dots 1$$

Where Y, S, N, P and L are the gross income per hectare of paddy, expenditure (in Rs. per hectare) on seeds, plant nutrients, plant protection measures (PPM), and labours respectively. The intercept has been denoted by 'a' and 'bis' are the coefficients or production elasticities of the respective inputs; and u is the random disturbance term. The Cobb-Douglas production functions on per hectare basis, as specified below in log-linear form, were estimated:

$$\ln Y = \ln a + b_1 \ln S + b_2 \ln N + b_3 \ln P + b_4 \ln L \quad \dots 2$$

Where, all the variables are as defined in equation (1). The above function was estimated by using the ordinary least squares technique. The production elasticities of the different inputs were used to calculate the MVP of the respective inputs.

$$MVP_{xi} = [(b_i) (Y)] / [X_i] \quad \dots 3$$

Where

MVP_{xi} = Marginal value product of ith input.

b_i = Production elasticity of the ith input

Y = Geometric mean level of gross income

X_i = Geometric mean of ith input

In this study, the inputs are in monetary terms. Hence, the MVP of any input (X_i) is the incremental change in the total output expressed in monetary terms obtained by the additional rupee spent on X_i input keeping the expenditure on the other inputs constant.

3.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The socio-economic variables considered for this purpose includes age composition, level of education, size of land holdings, and the caste-wise distribution of the respondents,

Age is one of the important demographic features of the respondents which will influence the decision making style in farming practices. The age of the respondents has been categorized under three groups viz young farmers (<35 years), middle-aged farmers (35-60years) and aged farmers (>60years). Frequency distribution of the farmers across the different age groups is given in table 1. Overall 70.4 percent of farmers belonged to middle age farmers followed by young farmers (16.75) and aged (12.9%) farmers respectively. It is the same in the case of organic and inorganic farmers in the hilly zone. Thus, there is no glaring difference between organic and inorganic farmers with respect to age of the respondents

Education is a key indicator of the knowledge level of the respondents which in turn will influence the decision making process in the adoption of farming practices. Respondents with higher level of education will be the pioneers in the adoption of innovative farming practices. Therefore, the data on the education level of the respondents are collected and presented in table 1. The education level of the respondents has been mainly classified into four categories viz. illiterates, respondents with primary, secondary and college education. In the overall category, highest percentage of the respondents were had the education up to the primary level (36.2%) and it was followed by the secondary (28.8%) and then college education (27.5%). Organic respondents were found to be having relatively higher level of education compared to the inorganic farmers. Respondents with college level of education are considerably more among the organic farmers (42.5%) compared to the inorganic farmers (12.5%). Similar difference could be found in the secondary education also. In the illiterate and primary education category the percentage of respondents is more among inorganic farmers (13.3%) compared to their counterparts in the organic farmers (1.7%). Thus, it could be inferred that the education level of the respondents influence the adoption of organic farming system. Organic farming is more attractive among educated respondents than the illiterates. It is evident that the educated respondents are more conscious about food and agro ecosystem and thereby farmers with higher level of knowledge adopt the resource conserving and environmental friendly organic farming.

Caste is one of the indicators of the social status of an individual. It influences decision-making status of an individual. The caste of the respondents has been mainly categorized into three groups SC&ST, OBC and General category. SC&ST are clubbed owing to the fact that there are a few respondents in this category.

The distribution of organic and inorganic respondents across the different categories presented in the table. In the overall category, out of 240 total respondents, 156 are found to belong to OBC followed by 70 belonging to General and 14 belonging to SC&ST category. The significant feature of results is that general category respondents accounts for higher share among the organic farmers (52.5%) compared to their share is relatively less in inorganic farming group (5.8%) whereas SC&ST category people accounts for higher percentage in the inorganic farming (10.8%) group compare to the organic farming (0.8%) group. It indicates that the caste is arranged in hierarchical order with the people from the higher community showing more inclination towards organic farming compared to the persons like SC and ST.

Table.1: Socio-Economic Conditions of Respondents

Sl.No.	Particulars	Organic Farmers	Inorganic Farmers	Overall
1	Age of Respondents Young Age (<35) Middle Age (35 to 60) Old Age(>60)	16(13.4) 91(75.8) 13(10.8) 120(100.0)	24(20.0) 78(65.0) 18(15.0) 120(100.0)	40(16.7) 169(70.4) 31(12.9) 240(100.0)
2	Education Illiterate Primary Secondary College Total	02(1.7) 25(20.8) 42(35.0) 51(42.5) 120(100.0)	16(13.3) 62(51.7) 27(22.5) 15(12.5) 120(100.0)	18(7.5) 87(36.2) 69(28.8) 66(27.5) 240(100.0)
3	Caste SC&ST OBC General Total	01(0.8) 56(46.7) 63(52.5) 120(100.0)	13(10.8) 100(83.4) 07(5.8) 120(100.0)	14(5.8) 156(65.0) 70(29.2) 240(100.0)
4	Size of Land Holdings Small Farms Large Farms Total	54(45.0) 66(55.0) 120(100.0)	78(65.0) 42(35.0) 120(100.0)	132(55.0) 108(45.0) 240(100.0)

Source: Field Survey Data

The most important finding of this result is that higher community people are more inclined towards organic farming and people from SC and ST still practice inorganic farming. Thus, it is a fact that the upper caste people show more awareness about the negative effects of high external input based and unsustainable inorganic farming. Hence large proportion of upper caste farmers switching over to organic farming than the lower caste farmers.

In a rural economy, land is one of the important socio-economic indicators. The size of land holding influences the cropping pattern, farming practices and adoption of modern technology. Data relating to the size of land holdings has been collected from the respondents. Based on the size of land holdings, the sample respondents have been broadly categorized into small farmers (< 2 hectares) and large farmers (>2 hectare). The frequency distribution of respondents across the various land holding category is presented in the table. In the overall category, 55 percent of respondents are in small size category and the remaining 45 percent are in large category. Considerably higher percentage of organic respondents (55%) is in the large size holdings compared to the inorganic respondents (35%). Small size of holding is relatively more among the inorganic respondents (65%) compared to the organic respondents (45%). Large farmers show relatively more inclination towards the organic farming compared to the small farmers.

3.2. RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY IN ORGANIC AND INORGANIC PADDY PRODUCTION

The efficiency in the use of each resource is assessed, based on Marginal Value Product (MVP) of a rupee spent on the respective resource or input. In order to compute the MVP of each resource, the Cobb-Douglas production functions on per hectare basis, as specified in section 2.1 were estimated. The estimates of production function for organic and inorganic paddy in HZ are presented in table 2. F values have been computed to test the significance of calculated production functions. The calculated F values are significant at one percent probability level for both the functions. Thus, the production functions fitted to the organic paddy as well as inorganic paddy are significant at one percent probability level. The coefficient of determination (R²) for organic paddy (0.42) and inorganic paddy (0.38) production function indicated a moderate degree of 'goodness of fit'. The

four resource specified in the function collectively explained the 42 percent variation in the gross returns from the organic paddy. Similarly, 38 percent of variation in the gross returns from the inorganic paddy is being explained by the inputs included in the function.

In HZ, the regression coefficients of plant nutrients and labour are also positive and significant in organic as well as inorganic paddy production functions. The production elasticities of labour as well as plant nutrients are positive but less than unity showing the diminishing marginal productivity with respect to labour and plant nutrients. PPMs have positive influence on the gross returns from the organic paddy and it is statistically significant at one percent probability level. Though PPMs have positive influence on the gross returns from the inorganic paddy, it is not statistically significant. It might be because the majority of organic farmers neglect plant protection measures with the belief that the organic crop is not susceptible to pest and disease and only a few very efficient organic farmers have taken plant protection measures. It indicates the need for taking proper plant protection measures even in the organic paddy. The coefficient of seed in organic as well as inorganic paddy production function is not statistically significant.

Table 2: Estimates of Paddy Production Function for HZ

Sl No.	Explanatory Variables	Organic Paddy	Inorganic Paddy
1	Intercept	1.894	2.438
		(1.882)	(3.887)*
2.	Seeds (Rs./ha)	-0.012	0.039
		(-1.633)	(0.515)
3	Plant nutrients (Rs./ha)	0.209	0.125
		(3.192)*	(2.951)*
4	PPM (Rs./ha)	0.004	0.005
		(5.051)*	(1.099)
5	Labour (Rs./ha)	0.541	0.510**
		(2.098)	(2.627) *
6	R2	0.42	0.38
7	F Value	13.64*	5.407*
8	Number of observations (n)	120	120

Note: 1. Figures in parentheses are calculated 't' values.

2. * and ** indicate significance at 1 and 5 per cent level respectively.

The MVPs of different inputs used in organic and inorganic paddy in HZ is given in table 3. In HZ, the MVP of plant nutrient is slightly less than one in organic as well as inorganic paddy. At the existing level of plant nutrients application MVP is less than the MFC and hence nutrient management is not efficient. It might be because of leaching out of plant nutrients in the floods. The landscape of the HZ in the district is such that the efficient management of nutrients is very difficult. The MVPs of labour is greater than one in organic as well as inorganic paddy production. At this level of labour use farmers could increase their net returns with still more quantity of labour. There is also scope for the use of additional quantity of PPM.

Table 3: MVPs of Different Inputs in Paddy Production in HZ

Sl. No.	Input	Organic Paddy	Inorganic Paddy
1	Seeds (Rs./ha)	-	-
2	Plant Nutrients(Rs./ha)	0.93	0.91
3	Plant Protection Measures (Rs./ha)	2.88	-
4	Labour (Rs./ha)	1.31	1.07

CONCLUSION

Agriculture is the mainstay of the people of Karnataka and the economy of the state depends largely on its agricultural production. Paddy is the major food crop in the state as well as in Shimoga district. It is evident that many farmers are swithing over from inorganic farming system to organic farming system in the district. Organic paddy farmers are well educated and belong to socially forward community compared to inorganic paddy farmers in the Shimoga district. Agricultural productivity depends on how factors are efficiently used in the production process. Resource use efficiency in agricultural production has been a major concern in the district. The production elasticities of labour as well as plant nutrients are positive but less than unity showing the diminishing marginal productivity with respect to labour and plant nutrients. PPMs have positive influence on the gross returns from the organic paddy and it is statistically significant at one percent probability level. It might be because majority of the organic farmers neglect plant protection measures with the belief that the organic crop is not susceptible to pest and disease and only few most efficient organic farmers have taken plant protection measures. It indicates the need for

taking proper plant protection measures even in the organic paddy. At the existing level of plant nutrients application MVP is less than the MFC and hence nutrient management is not efficient.

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CUBAN RESPONSE TO THE US POLICY POSTURES

- Rose Veera D Souza

Abstract

The US and Cuba are experiencing a historic thaw in their relations after almost five decades of their hostile relations. The age old conflicting relations are eased out and diplomatic ties are established between them. Way back in 1991, when the USSR disintegrated, quite a few assumed that the hostile relations between the US and Cuba may not hold any significance as the US no longer considers Cuba on futuristic strategic interests. However to the dismay of those who expected a change, the stringent policy of the US towards Cuba found further extension than curtailment. The US continued to follow the antagonistic policy towards Cuba despite major opposition across the world. This paper makes an attempt to give an account of the relations between these two countries especially after the disintegration of the USSR at the backdrop of present changing relations. The two harsh Acts that the US imposed on Cuba after 1991 in Torricelli and Jesse Helms Burton Act explain the severity of US policy towards Cuba. The Paper also assesses the Cuban response to these hostile policies and its strategy to withstand the forces. The paper revisits the dynamics of Cuba being a pariah state to the US in the phase of estrangement and the change initiated for being the partner in the changing situation. The process of Cuba enabling itself to this shift is also evident over these years.

Keywords: *Torricelli, Jesse Helms, Antagonistic, Cuban Response, Thaw*

INTRODUCTION

With the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the US policy postures challenged Cuba from all quarters with the worst consequences on its domestic and external affairs. As a result, the revolutionary goals that Cuba pursued experienced a heavy setback. Militarily, economically and ideologically Cuba entered into a crucial phase where it had to survive against the reducing Soviet block aid. Added to it, the tightened US embargo and its extraterritorial enforcement through new legislations proved punitive. An attempt is made in this paper to discuss the challenges Cuba encountered and the response it formulated to the US policy postures since the disintegration of the USSR.

Dr Rose Veera D Souza: Associates Professor, Dept. of Political Science, St. Aloysius College (Autonomous), Mangaluru- 575 003. Email: roseveera69@gmail.com

CONTEXTUAL CHALLENGES

The disintegration of the USSR brought an abrupt end to the 86 per cent trade Cuba had with the Soviet bloc. According to the estimates of a Cuban economist, economic aid to Cuba by USSR was estimated as US \$700 million in 1973 and three billion in 1989. But sources in the Soviet Academy of Sciences viewed that including military, technical assistance and commercial loans, Cuba's debt to USSR, as of November 1989 was US \$27.4 billion. The Cuban economy stagnated and declined approximately four per cent in 1990, declined to another 25 percent in 1991, and dropped by an additional 15 percent in 1992. According to the available data, the net import capacity of Cuba declined from US \$8.1 billion to US \$2.2 billion. The worst effects of the adverse climatic condition were acute. The negative effects of the long drawn drought, which began in May 1983, had also retained its impact. Commenting on the worst effects that Cuba encountered one of the authors wrote: For most Cubans, the end of the Cold war was not the fall of the Berlin Wall on CNN. It was the collapse of their lives before their own eyes, an all-too-real nightmare of constant blackouts, closed schools and hospitals, no spare parts, no consumer goods, no fertilizers, and little food... People stayed at home earning 60 per cent of their salaries in unemployment payments, which they had a hard time spending since there were no goods to buy."

Acknowledging the situation Raul Castro also stated: ...most of our equipment is based on socialist technology, mostly Soviet Union and we are facing the same situation, once again we are suddenly left without spare parts, we have to start trading with the rest of the world and we are back where we were 33 years ago, and we have to start again. This is the most important event for Cuba.

Confirming the worst effects Castro stated: "A terrible future awaits us; a future of slavery, dependency, repression, and looting." Soviet aid to Cuba was more than just an inflow of dollars. It included everything from rice, beans, or any essential commodity. Due to this crucial period, the prices Cuba paid for imported wheat, chicken, milk and petroleum went up between 16 and 40 per cent, while the prices of sugar and nickel diminished by 20 and 28 per cent respectively. Soviet oil supplies to Cuba declined from 13 million tons in 1989 to 10 million tons in 1990, to 8.6 million in 1991.

In the backdrop of the far-reaching changes in the USSR, Cuba faced the

challenge of legitimizing the Revolution. Though applied indigenously, Cuba had followed Marxism for three decades together. Hence, Cuba also faced a serious challenge to its political stability.

POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE CRUCIAL PERIOD

Interestingly, when the USSR brought in the rigorous reform measures and policies in 1985, Cuba had already initiated the process of change in the economic and political spheres. In order to reallocate its economy against the backdrop of the changing context, Castro acknowledged that a new phase had begun in Cuba. He portrayed the coming years as the period of 'rectification and revolutionary counteroffensive.' The steps that Cuba took during the first half of the 1980s toward economic liberalization like, peasant markets, licensed self-employment, and private sale of housing were curtailed. Castro asked the people of Cuba to excel so as to 'fight against things that the Cubans see being done wrong everywhere.' He emphasized on 'a consciousness, a communist spirit, and revolutionary will.' The rectification process that had begun in the later part of 1980s stabilized the socialist distribution formula, with strict control to prevent violations and eradicating inequality. Castro emphasized in both the material and moral incentives to the workers in order to attain better productivity as against the earlier emphasis on moral incentives. He encouraged the workers to balance material and moral incentives in mobilizing the work force. He stated:

"Material incentives are necessary to a certain extent...But it's a mistake to think that ...socialism can be built with material incentives, because only capitalism is built with material incentives alone. Socialism must be built with awareness [consciousness] and moral incentives..."

In order to revitalize the process of economic growth and to arrest the presence of idealism Castro emphasized implementation of pragmatic policies. Though some writers criticized this phase of rectification as the phase of incapacity, Castro's policy was proved appropriate to stabilize domestic and international economic conditions of Cuba and to boost its economy in the 1990s.

In 1990 to concretely thwart the setback due to shortage of food and other essential commodities, Castro initiated a massive food program and various measures to boost the economic sphere. Thousands of workers were mobilized to the countryside to work as fieldworkers in a new "food plan" intended to win

for agricultural self-sufficiency. Some workers from other sectors were assigned agricultural work and some other workers were offered higher wages if they agreed to reallocate themselves to the other food producing regions. Cuba entered in a 'special period in time of peace' to reorganize the internal economy and reinsert it into the world market. The austerity measures for self-sufficiency were introduced. Gas and electricity rationing applied. Bicycles and horse-drawn carriages became usual. Oxen began to supplement tractors. Electrification and mechanization, the two important facilities offered to the people as achievements of revolution were considerably cut down. Increased cold storage facility was built to store a portion of the vegetable crops for distribution in the next half of the year.

The food program produced mixed results. While milk production massively decreased, production of vegetables grew. Castro preferring to withstand the challenges, concentrated on the domestic development with coherent discipline and conformity. In order to cope with the challenges in the domestic and external affairs Cuba was forced to renounce its policy of assisting revolutionary movements.

TORRICELLI ACT AND CUBAN OVERTURES

Thus having lost its trade with the former Soviet bloc, Cuba suffered severely in 1991. Early in the Bush administration the policies towards Cuba appeared muted. Perhaps the US assumed that the Cuban regime would fall as a result of the challenges it faced and the US need not employ resources to overthrow the Castro regime. In 1989, US senator Connie Mack (Republican, Florida) introduced a legislation to prohibit trade between Cuba and the subsidiaries of US firms operating in third countries. It is agreeable that Mack's proposals were influenced by the component of Cuban American constituents. For consecutively three years from 1989 to 1991, the US state department opposed this proposal as it extended US legal jurisdiction beyond its boundaries. Hence, it did not make any headway in the Congress.

In 1991 the fiscal deficit of Cuba had shot up to more than 30 per cent of GDP. Added to it, the US imposed Torricelli Act and strengthened the embargo. "To cap it all, the US congress passed the "Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 with a caveat known as the "Torricelli Law" aimed at further stifling the crumbling Cuban

economy, and tightening the blockade" The Cuban Democracy Act drafted by US representative Robert Torricelli featured the similar provisions of Mack proposal. The Torricelli Act had its worst effects on the Cuban society. It isolated Cuba in the international fora and the Cuban economic deterioration further deepened between 1990-1993. Cuba suffered due to the shortage of hard currency, falling imports, decreased production and rise in black marketing. Though the official rate of the peso was equal to one dollar the exchange rate on the streets shot up to 130 pesos per dollar.

The US sounded very specific in its purpose of bringing down the collapse of Cuban economy and with it the removal of Fidel Castro from power. In December 1992, a month after the passage of the Act, Robert Torricelli, architect and proponent of the act stated publicly, that the Act would bring about the fall of Castro "within weeks." And in 1993 he asserted that it was to "wreak havoc in Cuba" and get rid of Castro.

As the Act prohibited all transactions of goods from Cuba that contained a trace of Cuban input to the US, Companies operating outside the US were prohibited to sell goods that contained more than 20 per cent of inputs or based on any type of US technology. Besides, the foreign companies wishing to sell goods to Cuba that contained 10 to 20 per cent of the US inputs required the permission of the US treasury. The US nationals who were directors of companies operating outside the US were prevented from dealing with Cuba. The foreign banks owned by the foreign nationals, operating in foreign soil were not permitted to maintain dollar-dominated accounts for Cuba or to conduct dollar dominated transactions.

Due to this the foreign trade of Cuba was largely affected. The French Conglomerate Company cancelled its contracts with Cuba to build factories transforming bagasse into hardboard in exchange for Cuban nickel, as it cannot sell the products that contained Cuban nickel. Even foreign confectionary companies were not allowed to export chocolate bars made with Cuban sugar to the US. Ricardo Alarcon, the Cuban ambassador to the United Nations, in a speech to the General Assembly stated that 27 per cent cases of foreign trade contacts with Cuba were interrupted by US pressure.

Besides, the US pressurized the countries to sever their economic relations. It used both persuasive and punitive measures (sanctions) to pressurize the other

nations to follow the Torricelli Act. Cuba opposed the Act stating that it jeopardized the sovereignty of Cuba. The Act's heavy-handed pressure with a clear external threat against Cuba provided Castro's government an opportunity to rally the people, insisting on internal discipline and conformity to national ideals. Emphasis was laid on refurbishing economy and political system. The Cuban press criticized the Act and used the occasion to bring out the nationalistic agenda against the act. According to an author "The regime was able to claim more convincingly than ever that the United States is at fault for at least part of Cuba's future economic troubles and that Washington was more predisposed to adopt aggressive actions against Cuba than previously."

The Act demanded that Cuba compensate the US citizens and companies whose properties were nationalized in the 1960s by Castro. Cuba counter-argued its claim to be compensated against the damages of Bay of Pigs administered by the US in 1961. According to the Cubanologists the Act impeded commercial operations in terms of food and medicines, amounting to over US \$700 million imports. It also encroached upon the sovereign rights of the countries by subordinating the will of the third country.

The Act forcefully discussed that the normalization of relation between the US and Cuba could proceed only when democratic institutions were established in Cuba. Reacting to the US proposed conditions for normalization process Castro stated: To the regime, socialist austerity and permanent hardship and sacrifice are preferable to capitalist penetration. Improving relation with a dynamic, democratic, often arrogant superpower is not cost-free. Cuba also reiterated its position stated in Third Congress of the PCC which read:

When the US decides, to negotiate seriously, and ready to deal with the spirit of equality, reciprocity and utmost mutual respect, Cuba will respond.

The Torricelli Act was subjected to criticism at the international forum especially from the European Union, Canada, Mexico and China, the close allies of the US. Against the act the foreign office of the UK stated: "The British minister of trade and industry examines it more clearly. The British government and not the U.S. customs determine the policy on trading with Cuba." The American business section also expressed discontentment over the act, as they were keen to resume business with Cuba. A businessman of the US was quoted to have stated that:

"This undercuts our own country's economic interests."

The Latin American countries also voiced their resentment to the Torricelli Act. The president, of Latin American Parliament Hubert Celli, stated: "The Torricelli aimed to "continue hitting the Cuban people... we should not accept"

Cuba's condition still deteriorated as the USSR formally disintegrated. The US estimated that the subsidies from the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to Cuba in 1992 amounted to be approximately US \$65,000,000 or only about 6 per cent of the aid received in 1991 and 2 per cent received of the 1990 figure.

Manuel Salgado, the interim President of the Ecuadorian Congress, visited Cuba in April 1992 stated: "It showed that US governing circles have not modified in the least their imperial policies, which dream of a unipolar world rooted in subjugation and slavery."

POLICY SHIFTS: ADJUSTMENTS AND GROWTH

In order to cope with the situation of sanctions and shortages, Cuba made efforts to encourage tourism, biotechnology, and domestic food production to retain and to generate scarce foreign exchange. The PCC in its fourth Congress in 1991 extensively listed the core areas of development like the promotion of hotel and tourism, industry, biotechnology exports, and search for new trading partners. Hotelier and pharmaceutical industries were highly promoted. Reports said that "With the advancement of biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, Cuba had the potential of seven million dollars per annum provided meaningful and appropriate strategies." Castro, in the fourth Congress, stated: "I can assure you that biotechnology and the pharmaceutical and the equipment industry offer us greatest prospects, and one day they may bring in much more revenue than our sugar." Accepting the changes that the Cuban system underwent, Castro stated: "We are introducing elements of capitalism into our system, into our economy, this is a fact." In a statement to the fourth Congress Castro further stated:

If they [foreign investors] bring capital for building the hotel plus their experience - that is technology and the market, and we provide the work force and materials, it is absolutely correct to create an association, from which we will both benefit. If we didn't do that, beaches would not be used, and the hotel wouldn't be built.

Joint ventures clash with any principle of Marxism, Socialism or the Revolution. They may clash with sentimentalism: We'd like the hotel and all the profits to be for us.

Cuba witnessed an increase in gross hard currency tourism revenue from \$75 million in 1984 to \$250 million in 1991 and an estimated \$400 million in 1992. As a part of the recovery strategy Cuba, opened up its foreign investments, in order to boost Capital. Justifying his stand Castro, even acknowledged the growing trend towards Capitalism in one of the interviews given to Gillian Gun:

In no book of Marx, Engels, or Lenin it is said that it is possible to construct socialism without capital, without technology, and without markets.... In the case of a small island like Cuba...it is especially difficult to develop using one's resources. It is for this reason that we have no alternative but to associate ourselves with foreign companies that can bring capital, technology and markets...[we] are dealing with ...a world where a large part of the socialist system has collapsed.

The Constitution clearly stated the opportunities for foreign trade. Art.14 "established that "...the governing economic system is based on the socialist ownership by all the people of the fundamental means of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man." This had a marked difference with the earlier statement which enumerated the "people" ownership of all means of production." In this context, Cuban Law permitted three types of foreign investment (1) joint ventures (2) production agreement (3) joint account.

This resulted in increasing exports with a growth of 16% in 1994. According to the available sources, in mid-1992, there were approximately 240 foreign companies operating in Cuba, 60 of which were joint ventures. Prior to 1992, only 50 organisations were involved and this number considerably increased to three times in the coming years. Government sources also stated that 100 new ventures were in the negotiation phase as late as 1992. Thus along with the austerity measures, Cuba also opened up the broad avenues of development to counteract the US policies. The Cuban tobacco industry also grew as the Western Europe became an important market for the Cuban citrus fruits.

The reforms initiated in Cuba in mid-1993 aiming at growth for the future years

emphasized on increasing the flow of foreign exchange, reducing government expenditures and increasing the supply of goods and services.

As a part of innovative measures Cuban managerial class was exposed to new techniques of market research and distribution. "Employment on own account" decree issued on 8 September 1993 aimed at creating opportunities of employment to relieve the burden on state budget. This encouraged non-wage-related employments. The persons involved in such activity were allowed to sell only those products that they manufactured themselves or with the help of their family members in order to prevent the emergence of intermediaries.

However, despite the government measures and policies the average monthly salary of a Cuban was 160 pesos. The black market for dollars grew beyond the control of the State. In August 1994, protestors fed up with power cuts, food shortages took to the streets. The still ongoing difficulties forced the government to experiment innovative measures.

Recognizing the role played by the US dollar in Cuba's extensive black markets and in order to improve the foreign exchange possibilities, the penalties on holding the US currency relieved considerably. This allowed the Cubans to buy goods in the foreign exchange stores previously reserved for foreigners. One of the major limitations of the dollar was that it increased the inequalities among the masses. Aware of the complexity of such a step, Castro stated: "The realities of today's life have forced us to do this, it is painful, but we have no other choice."

In order to protect economic stability public transport was reduced owing to lack of spare parts and fuel. Castro announced cuts in the supply of milk, sugar, beef, kerosene and clothing. The traditionally export-oriented products of Cuba that amounted to 90 per cent of Cuba's exports were given a second thought to be concomitant with the newly sufficing industries like medical infrastructure, unspoiled beaches. Basically, the traditional economy of Cuba was a monocultural economy dominated by sugar production. Tobacco, nickel, citrus fruits, fish were the other traditional products of Cuba. The changes were brought in the state farms too. The Politburo passed a resolution on 10 September 1993 to officially stop the state farms, which form 73 per cent of the land and account for 78 per cent of agricultural production to be transformed into co-operatives.

The co-operatives were given the rights of autonomy over the state farms, while retaining the state ownership over them. Cuba expanded its foreign trade to other countries.

Realizing the need to introduce further changes in the economy, Castro introduced a new investment law in 1994. Castro realised that tourism alone would not solve the problems and hence instead of introducing cosmetic changes in the economic system Cuba had to redefine its economic order. Though the government measures were very cautious at the initial phase it gathered momentum later when the government realized that, it would help to capture economy the foreign currency essential to safeguard the education and health-care achievements of socialism.

The new investment law made the process of investing flexible and easier enabling, direct investment legal and security to the foreign investors. It also assured the investors the guarantee against expropriation, compensation and the freedom of repatriation of profits and capital out of Cuba, and the option of selling. Articulating the features of the new direct foreign investment policy, Vice-President Carlos Lage, on 30 October 1994, before the 12th Havana International Fair stated:

We are offering you an orderly country, a coherent and irreversible policy of openness to capital investment, a sufficient and extended economic infrastructure, a productive sector aimed at achieving efficiency, a hard-working, devoted, highly educated and trained people, a society without terrorism or drugs.

Making the dollar holdings legal enabled the government to wrest dollars from private hands. It also enabled the Cubans to spend the dollars freely for the first time and spur the flow of remittances. Government also created state-owned dollar retail stores in order to facilitate the Cubans to buy goods in the hard currency. The Economic Minister of Cuba in 1994 stated: "The objective is to sell products to those who have dollars at very high prices: then the government will be able to redistribute the profits among those who need it more." Cuba also tried to persuade as many countries as possible to bring their dollars to Cuba, encouraging investment in specific sectors of its economy especially in mining, permitting 100 per cent foreign ownership, and creating free-trade zones.

In mid 1994 the Cuban government adopted a series of reform measures to

reduce the fiscal deposit. It cut subsidies to state enterprises increased the prices of cigarettes, gasoline, alcohol, electricity, and other goods and services. The government also established tax system in order to collect revenue.

Justifying the need of such changes in the economic policy, the Minister for Basic Industries, stated in 1995, "We went to bed one night and when we woke up, the Soviet Union was gone, so we had to begin all over again. The same thing had occurred years before with the United States. This is not going happen again to us."

In order to improve trade and political relations within the hemisphere Cuba extended its association to Latin American countries and tried to stabilize itself against the worst effects of embargo. Cuba evolved for itself a distinct system, different from Soviet Union and began to stabilize and institutionalize the process. "The Cuban effort to develop and reorganize the economy can be better understood if it is placed within a broader context. Cuba is in an unenviable position, as are the other twentieth century societies that have initiated or maintained a revolution under the banner of socialism. It confronts both the need to transform social relations and the tasks of developing the productive forces of society." Cuba disposed itself to pursue the undiluted enthusiasm and dedication to the mission of 'preservation of revolution' through stabilization of social and political means.

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSE

Along with the problems that Castro had to wrestle with, he also had to guard his regime from getting disintegrated. During the fourth Congress, significant changes were introduced in the ideological sphere. Cuba clarified that it would not follow the model of the USSR. The Fidelistas specifically insisted. "We do not need Russian communism. If Marx and Lenin had not existed, Fidel would have invented Marxism in anyway."

The nationalistic goals of Jose Marti were emphasised in order to stabilize and ideologically link the political system. Making it more clear Castro stated:

"The ideology that was our guide even before the Moncada, the ideology in which the leaders of our movement sought the answers to understand and transform the situation in Cuba, could be none other than the ideology of working

class, the ideology of Socialism integrally linked to the most advanced Cuban patriotic and revolutionary thought."

Protecting the achievements of socialism was considered important against the challenges cited by changes in the USSR. "Socialism or Death "became an important slogan of the day. Aware of the US reaction to the situation, Castro stated:

"The US imperialists think that Cuba won't be able to hold out and the new situation in the socialist community will inexorably help them to bring our Revolution to its knees. Cuba is not a country in which socialism came in the wake of the victorious division of the Red Army. In Cuba our people created our socialist society in the course of a legitimate, heroic struggle. The 30 years in which we have stood firm against the most powerful empire on earth, that sought to destroy our Revolution, bear witness to our political or moral strength."

The Communist Partido de Cuba (PCC) symbolized the ideological growth and political assertiveness. It spearheaded the innovations to meet challenges of the constrained times. Through rectification process and institutionalization, measures were initiated to increase and consolidate the power of the political party. Emphasis was given to mass participation, to facilitate democratization and to build socialism. Castro ruled out the possibilities of imitations with regard to the changes in the USSR. Though Cuba was compelled to introduce changes proper control was ensured while bringing such changes. Castro said: "We are making changes, but without giving our independence and sovereignty...without giving up the real principle of government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

In March 1990 Raul Castro declared *Llamamiento* to rectify the dogmatic weaknesses of the political and administrative structures, which were learnt to be the major causes for the disintegration of Soviet bloc. *Llamamiento* document criticized the PCC's "dogmatic" tendency to create "false unanimity", which may lead to pretense, double moral standards, or the silencing of opinions. It emphasised the process of "consulting the masses" to allow changes in order to find avenues to meet the growing demands and challenges.

Llamamiento, refurbishing the ideology to meet the challenges emphasized the

national origin of the revolution and socialism in Cuba. It stated the contending claims of the Party to overcome the present challenges.

"Our single party Martiano and Marxist, Leninist, assumes great responsibilities before the society. [And must strive] to separate ourselves definitively from formalisms, liturgies and other manifestations that undermine political and ideological work"

It gave importance to the rejection of multi-party bourgeois democracy; the insistence that socialism would be preserved at all costs; and the notion that Cuba had major historical responsibilities towards the oppressed and progressive people of the world. The ideological shift was embedded in the nationalist goals. The PCC gave thrust to refurbishing the economy. Ultimately, Castro "blended Marxist analysis, Leninist tactics and Cuban nationalism in a unique brand of Caribbean socialism."

The term 'communist' was employed with a new implication. "The term 'communist' has not been used simply to designate someone who believes in a particular doctrine or adheres to a certain line of thinking. Above all, communists are seen as people dedicated to the ideals of national independence, social justice, and progress for our people, the very goals of the Revolution." The Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) was stabilized with a view to meet the growing challenges. Similarly, Organization of People's Power was created. National Assembly also refurbished with more powers, mass organizations were supervised and the institutionalization process grew. The PCC and the whole political system grew to adapt to changing times. Acknowledging the need to change, Fidel Castro stated: "I am neither pragmatic nor dogmatic nothing is permanent, everything changes." In order not to deviate from the long drawn goals and to evolve a mechanism of steering enthusiasm Fidel Castro emphasized more and more on the nationalistic zeal of Jose Marti.

Cuba made it clear that nowhere would it fall into the domain of US. It was very evident when Castro said that it is necessary to preserve, above all, 'the revolutionary morale authority, prestige and examples of the Communist Militant.'

The ideological precepts towards the third world countries were also highlighted with new zest. Though Cuba had renounced its assistance to the revolutionary

movements in Africa and Latin American states, it expressed its solidarity with them. Supporting the cause of such solidarity Castro stated: "Today, by force, the struggle of any country, any people, especially the Third World peoples, becomes a struggle for the whole world, a universal struggle. Any contribution to the struggle counts, however modest. Some can do more, some less, depending on certain factors and circumstances."

Cuba reasserted its stand against US preeminence. It clearly published the view that the decline of the economy of Cuba was not due to Cuba's inefficiency in stabilizing political and ideological refurbishing against the crumbled USSR but because of US imposed blockade. Torricelli Act, which intensified the preeminence of the US on Cuba, brought Cuba to the utmost scrutiny, in terms of its economy, political system and ideological formulations.

Thus Cuba that had witnessed a paradigm of internationalist and pro-Soviet policy till the 1980's revived its formulations at the wake of the unbridled hostility of the US and internal economic, ideological and political demands. The Torricelli Act instead of crumbling Cuba gave an added impetus to build a stronger Cuba. The challenges drove Cuba to determine the future course of actions in the path of development.

The initiatives that Castro had taken up provided Cuba with considerable growth. The proportion of land in the hands of the non-state agricultural sector grew from 24.8 per cent in 1992 to almost 70 per cent in 1994. Self-employment yielded reasonably good response and approximately 15 per cent of the work force was estimated to be working directly or indirectly within self-employed sector in 1996. The government also earned money on these services through a combination of monthly fees and income.

In 1994 when the exodus to Florida from Cuba took place the writers had argued that it was the result of internal political tension, symbolizing the collapse of Cuban system. Against this the Cuban political system remained intact and the economy also recovered. In his 26 July speech in 1995 President Fidel Castro announced that the economy had grown by 2 per cent in the first half of 1995. In 1989, there were 326,000 tourists who visited Cuba. By mid-1994, Cuba's Tourism Minister indicated that the island would receive one million tourists by 1996 with an annual income of US \$1 billion. Other joint ventures included the

sale of the country's telephone system and the involvement of 10 firms in the Cuban nickel mining industry by early 1995. Cuba's growth was estimated to be 2.5 to 3.5 percent in 1998 despite the low sugar harvest, drought, Hurricane Georges, and the obstacle posed by the economic sanctions under the US blockade.

According to official sources, Cuba was to obtain US \$1800 million in gross revenue from tourism alone. Tourism became the most dynamic sector of the island's economy. Though unemployment remained considerably high new avenues for development were created. The foreign investments developed giving an idea that Cuba was marching towards capitalism. Though Castro rejected this view earlier, later in 1995 he stated: "We are introducing elements of capitalism into our system, into our economy, this is a fact". Further he emphasized that the application of capitalism was not accidental instead, the result of well thought strategy. He clarified it further stating that "we have also discussed the consequences, we have observed from the employment of those mechanisms. Yes, we are doing this [implementing capitalism]" However, again in the fall of 1995, Castro clarified that the economic reforms "do not signify a return to capitalism, much less a crazy and uncontrolled rush in that direction.... We have swept away the capitalist system, and it will never return as long as there is a communist, a patriot, a revolutionary in Cuba.... Our main objective is to preserve the revolution, our independence, and the achievements of socialism."

Despite the promotion of self-employment measures and the opening of foreign investments that allowed the foreign capitalists to join hands with Cuban state-owned corporations, the Cuban-style of capitalism functioned on the growing government regulations and taxation. The reforms accompanied restrictions. The government took measures to punish those who tried to bend the rules

The self-employment projects were brought under strict rule. The government reserved unto itself the right to limit self-employment where there was a local labor shortage. An individual could sell only what he or she produced. The middlemen were avoided. No one could hire workers. And university graduates were not allowed to work on their own account. The implementation of reforms helped the Cuban economy to grow. The GDP went up by 15 per cent since 1994, with a four per cent growth expected for 1999. In spite of the distortions

generated by keeping the official exchange rate at 1 peso per dollar, the unofficial exchange rate was stabilized at 19 pesos per dollar, and the fiscal deficit was kept at two per cent growth rate. .

When the US found the Torricelli Act ineffective it further tightened the blockade through a new act, called the Jesse Helms-Burton Act.

RESPONSE TO HELMS-BURTON OR LIBERTAD ACT

Cuba's success in mobilizing policy initiatives and producing considerable development did not make a difference in the US-Cuba relations. The positive steps Cuba had taken up through foreign investments did not pave the way for relaxation in the tightened embargo. As Cuba was making gradual attempts for growth and stability, US imposed Helms Burton Act on Cuba and strengthened the embargo.

The Act was the improved version of Torricelli Act and it prohibited Cuba to buy anything that contained US technology. A Swedish company was prohibited from selling a sophisticated spare part of medical equipment to Cuba because it contained a filter patented under US law. Numerous such trade transactions between Cuba and the other foreign corporations - involving spare parts for x-ray machines from France, neurological diagnostic equipment from Japan, parts to clean dialysis machines from Argentina, Italian made chemicals for water treatment, and many others- were likewise prevented by US law.

The Jesse Helms Burton Act was highly criticized at the international level. Such actions on the part of those opposing the Act encouraged the Cubans. The co-operation extended by Japanese, Swiss, Italian, and other citizens helped in the refurbishment of the ontological wards of Juan Manuel Marquez Pediatric Hospital in Havana.

In December 1996, Cuba implemented the legislation called the Law Affirming Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty (Ley de Reafirmacion de la Dignidad y Soberania Cubans), as a response to Jesse Helms Burton Act. It created broad restrictions on the right to free expressions. It empowered the government to punish and even criminalise those Cubans found supporting US policies, thus making it mandatory against the Burton Act. Cuba condemned the US attempts to strengthen the embargo through the Act. The national assembly discussed the damage the

blockade had caused since its imposition.

In the proclamation of the National Assembly Cuba cited the report of American Association for World Health (AAWH) 1997. The report of AAWH, after making a study of the consequences of the embargo concluded that it appears to violate the most basic international charters and conventions governing human rights, including the United Nations charter, the charter of the Organisation of American States, and the articles of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of civilians during wartime. [...] The Geneva Conventions to which 165 countries are parties, including the United States, require the free passage of all medical supplies and foodstuffs intended for civilians in time of war. The United States and Cuba are not at war. Infact, their governments even maintain diplomatic representations in Havana and Washington. Nevertheless, the AAWH has determined that the embargo's restrictions signify the deliberate blockading of the Cuban population 's access to food and medicine- in times of peace."

In February 1997 Cuba passed a ministerial resolution and prescribed strict restrictions on foreign media. The foreign media was warned to follow these regulations while reporting the news about Cuba. The regulations stated that the foreign correspondent display "objectivity, adhering strictly to the facts and in consonance with the professional ethics that govern journalism". In February 1999 Cuba's national assembly approved a law titled Protection of the National Independence and the Cuban Economy (Ley de Proteccion de la Independencia Nacional y la Economia de Cuba) that came into effect in March 1999. The law brought into effect harsh penalties of upto twenty years of imprisonment for any actions that would in any way support the US embargo on Cuba.

The Proclamation by the National Assembly of People's Power of the Republic of Cuba on 13 September condemned the embargo and declared that the tightened blockade constitute an international crime of genocide, in accordance with the definition stipulated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The National Assembly also declared to punish the guilty parties with life imprisonment and charging material compensation for the human and economic damage it may have caused.

The Jesse Helms Burton Act prohibited the freedom of travel between US

and Cuba without a special license. In 1998, only diplomats or members of inter governmental organizations such as the UN could travel from the US to Cuba without adhering special license. Cuba criticized the US embargo being responsible for the human rights violations in Cuba.

In order to withstand the difficulties The Burton Act presented, Cuba associated with the alternate trading partners countries like Canada, Russia, Japan, the UK etc and resuscitated the zeal to protect its economy. Realising that just cosmetic changes would not lead to solutions, Cuba sought to develop close economic ties with the countries of the region to put an end to its diplomatic isolation and to present itself as a normal state, adhering to the principles of international co-existence. The health and medical facilities were widened Cuba reported an infant mortality rate of 6.4 for every thousand live births on 4 January 1999 as against 10 per cent of 1989.

The Pope's visit to Cuba brought in some prospects for a normalization process. It paved the way for some change in the travel ban as Clinton eased some restrictions and restored direct charter flights from the US to Cuba that the US had banned in 1996. The relations appeared to be entering a new phase. In the backdrop of changing power equations analysts on US-Cuba relations argued for a pragmatic approach towards building up better relations. As Sir Leon Brittan, the European Union's Trade Commissioner, suggested while criticizing the Jesse Helms Burton Act, "The best way to get change in Cuba is not to cobbler your allies, and that is what they have done."

However, it took almost a decade for the US from thereon to bring in a change in its perspective towards Cuba and it is indeed worth applauding that the US finally realized the need for it. Though the change of regime from Fidel Castro to Raul Castro strengthened hopes in this direction it needed a deliberate effort from the US to see that its policy towards Cuba initiated a shift; a change; a new beginning. The lingering hostility finally entered a new phase when President Barack Obama began to work on the normalization process by easing the US restrictions on Travel and remittances to Cuba in 2009, gradually after he was sworn in as the president of the US. Of course the long awaited changing foreign policy equations may prove to be very significant to both nations and the world society in the wake of the new challenges of the present times.

Note:

- 1 For details, see Alfred Padula, "Cuban Socialism: Thirty Years of Controversy," in Enrique A. Baloyra, and James A. Morris, eds., *Conflict and Change in Cuba* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p. 33.
- 2 For details, Jose Luis Rodriguez, "Changes in Policy and Performance of the Economy, 1986-89", in Joseph S. Tulchin and Rafael Hernandez, eds., *Cuba and the United States, Will the Cold War in the Caribbean End?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 10.
- 3 Quoted from, Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, "What Cuba Can Teach Russia", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1998-99, no, 113 p.91.
- 4 Raul Castro interview in *El Sol De Mexico*, (Havana: Defense Information Center, 1993), p.24.
- 5 Quoted in Brian Latell, "Is Castro Ready to Change?" in Jorge Antonio and Jaime Suchlicki, and others, eds., *Cuba in a Changing World* (Miami: Research Institute for Cuban Studies, 1991), p.32.
- 6 Quoted in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban Economy in 1980's: The Return of Ideology", in Sergio Roca, ed., *Socialist Cuba Past Interpretations and Future Challenges*, (Boulder: Westview Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean, 1988), p. 77.
- 7 Quoted in Dalbir Singh, "Evolution and Role of the Communist Party in Cuba", (New Delhi: Classical Publishing Company 1999), p. 147.
- 8 Quoted from, Wayne S. Smith "Shackled to the Past: The United States and Cuba", in *Current History* (Philadelphia), vol. 95, no.59, February 1996 p.51.
- 9 Stated in Carmela –Mesa Lago, "The Cuban Economy in 1980's: The Return of Ideology", in Sergio Roca, ed., *Socialist Cuba Past Interpretations and Future Challenge*, (Boulder: West view Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean, 1988), p.35.
- 10 Quoted from Gillian Gunn, *Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy*(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993), p. 47.
- 11 Quoted in Juan M. de Aguilla, "Cuba's Relations in the late 1980s", Sergio Roca ed., *Socialist Cuba, Past Intterpretations and Future Challenges*,(Boulder: Westview Press,1989), p. 28.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 See Wayne S. Smith "Shackled to the Past: The United States and Cuba", *Current History*, February 1996, vol.95, No.598, p.51.
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WOMEN'S POLITICAL UNDERREPRESENTATION: FOCUS ON UNITED STATES AND INDIA

- Kayla Douglas

Abstract

The success of participatory Democracy solely depends on the measure of equal representation secured in the society. Women political representation has been one of those focal concerns of our society as it can coherently enable the objectives of an equal participatory model. The powerful countries like the US and the less powerful countries like India do grapple on this issue consistently, and have a lot to achieve on this ground. This paper attempts to analyze the need for political representation, by assessing the status of underrepresentation of women in this context. It also evidently analyses the reasons for such under representation in the political arena of the US and also assesses the change and concerns of Indian political society being a large popular democracy of the world. Political representation is the key to greater freedom and growth of women in society and their ability to participate in decision-making process. Gender politics has to be a reality in the present society so as to achieve an equal world. Why women are likely to be less motivated to participate in politics is likely to be ascribed by the society and not naturally born.

Keywords: Political under-representation, Women, Participation, decision-making, Democracy.

INTRODUCTION

The world over, women are battling to have their voices heard not just within their families, but also on a broader political scale. While women's representation in decision-making bodies has increased significantly since the 1990s, they still remained relegated to the background in vast numbers. Even when analyzing a dominant world power like the United States, one can clearly see room for improvement in women's political representation. Further, less developed countries with even poor thresholds for gender equality, such as India, have much progress to make in this arena.

Today in the United States, a fair share of attention is given to feminist issues. Whether it is female reproductive rights or double standards in media censorship, women's voices demand to be heard. Conversely, we do not hear

* **Ms Kayla Douglas:** State University of New York, Sunny Cortland.

Email : kayla.douglas01@gmail.com

much about their lack of political representation. Even as one of the most progressive nations in the world, it is a fact that the United States of America has never had a woman Commander in Chief. Further, while there is much speculation that former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton will run for the office of President in 2016, it is well understood that her gender will be a factor in her perceived electability.

In recent years, studies have been conducted to try and find the root causes of women's absence in the political world. A research piece called, *Men Rule: The Continued Under-Representation of Women in U.S. Politics*, by American University faculty serves to shed insightful analytical data on the disparity. Interestingly enough, AU researchers claim that the problem is rooted in "a substantial gender gap in political ambition" (Fox & Lawless, p.ii). Meaning that, from the start, fewer women are even interested in running for political office. So, the question remains, "why are women less motivated to be involved in politics?" Clearly, this is not a natural born tendency, but rather, a learned one.

AU identifies seven factors that either directly or indirectly complicate women's decision to run for office in America. These reasons include:

1. Women are substantially more likely than men to perceive the electoral environment as highly competitive and biased against female candidates
2. Hilary Clinton and Sarah Palin's candidacies aggravated women's perceptions of gender bias in the electoral arena
3. Women are much less likely than men to think they are qualified to run for office
4. Female potential candidates are less competitive, less confident, and more risk averse than their male counterparts
5. Women react more negatively than men to many aspects of modern campaigns
6. Women are less likely than men to receive the suggestions to run for office - from anyone
7. Women are still responsible for the majority of childcare and household tasks (Fox & Lawless, p.ii)

Naturally, there is a great deal of deeper implications and meaning to each of these listed factors above. In general, they indicate that a perception of gender based fear plays into their absence. Thus, the issue is deeply socially and culturally rooted. From these seven reasons, we can draw the conclusion that women do not receive enough support to wage a successful campaign. Many of them, despite valid qualifications, will never receive the vital mentorship and fiscal support required. Further, it is clear that even in 2015, women bear more of the childrearing and home-maintenance responsibilities. These factors, combined with many others, prevent them from even trying to be elected.

Unfortunately, one cannot confine American women's underrepresentation to just the White House, or even Congress. Women are grossly outnumbered all the way down to the local levels of government on a countrywide basis. Data from 2011 reported that the percentage of women office holders is dismal at best. Ranked from highest to lowest posts, the numbers were reported as follows: U.S. Senators (17.0%), Members of the House of Representatives (16.8%), State Governors (12.0%), Statewide Elected Officials (22.4%), State Legislators (23.6) and Mayors of the 100 Largest Cities (8.0%) (Fox & Lawless, p.1). Perhaps the most shocking figure is the final one; if only 8 /100 major U.S. cities trust a woman to lead them, it seems utterly impossible to permeate into higher levels of government.

Clearly, such blatant inequality is utterly unacceptable for a nation said to set an example for the entire world. These appalling statistics put American women below representation levels in far less developed countries such as Angola (38.6%), Bulgaria (20.8%), Costa Rica (38.6%) and Vietnam (25.8%) (Rosen, p.319). Further, it shows only slight improvement from the 1992 figure of 11 percent (Rosen, p.306). This means that over the course of nearly twenty years, American women made only 5.8 percent advancement towards equal representation in Congress.

As one of the permanent five members in the Security Council of the United Nations, it is crucial that the U.S. improves its statistics. In comparison to its P5 counterparts, America ranks only worse than Russia, with 14 percent representation of its women (Rosen, p.319). It is recorded that France (18.9%), China (21.3%) and the United Kingdom (22%) all fare better (Rosen, p.319). Yet, each of these

figures shows gross room for improvement. In fact, all five powerhouses fall short of attaining the United Nation's goal of "30 percent women's representation in Parliament" (Chauvel, p.22).

Fortunately, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is battling to achieve gender equality on many fronts. One such avenue is their encouragement of women to be actively involved in politics. Rightfully so, the United Nations projects that in societies that are more equal, issues such as reducing child and maternal mortality, improving access to education for women and girls, combatting HIV, TB, malaria and other diseases or improving the environment, are likely to be more sustainable (Chauvel, p.22). Yet, according to the United Nation's publication, *The Parliamentarian*, "gender politics is still a distant reality in most countries" (Chauvel, p.22).

In the context of the uneven representation of women in Parliament, one of the most critical geographical areas to fixate upon is Asia. Despite being home to an absolute majority (59.5%) of the world's women, this area of the world ranks terribly with regards to this issue (Joshi & Kingma, p.353). In 2011, only 8% of ministerial posts in Asian governments were occupied by women (Joshi & Kingma, p.353). This is in comparison to the 17% worldwide average figure given by "UN Women" (Joshi & Kingma, p.353).

Clearly, India is a nation that falls into this Asian categorization of Parliamentary underrepresentation. On a positive note, there have been increased percentages of representation in the country as the following statistics illustrate: 1960 (6%), 1970 (6%), 1980 (5%), 1990 (5%), 2000 (9%), 2010 (11%) (Joshi & Kingma, p.361). However, as this article will further delve into this matter, these numbers are not high enough to celebrate real success. There are several schemes that, if implemented, could further increase these percentages across the subcontinent.

As an entity for change, the United Nations Development Plan has enacted a specific set of guidelines to help bring India to higher levels of women representatives. They have called for a caucus of women political leaders that traverse the party lines in hopes of increasing numbers within parties (Chauvel, p.26). Further, their major aim is to push the passing of the Women's Reservation Bill that would mandate one-third of all seats in the Lower House of Parliament

and all state legislative assemblies to be reserved for women. This would ensure that women's voices could be better heard on a national level.

Fortunately, there are already schemes in place to ensure women's participation at lower levels of government. For instance, in 1993, the Constitution of India was amended so that one-third of village-level Gram Panchayats were for women. This is certainly progress; particularly because there is evidence stating that women perform better in the long-run than male-led Panchayats on an index of eight services: drinking water, toilets, gutters, schools, ration shops, self-help groups, implementation of welfare schemes and reducing male alcoholism (Lal). Yet, "women who had contested in local self-government elections pointed out that having a large base of elected women at the Panchayat level is not enough to ensure that more women will contest or win elections at the state or higher levels" (Chauvel, p.27). So, just as in the United States, India women face a plethora of challenges in winning votes.

Many lines of commonality can be drawn on a global level with regard to roadblocks for women in politics. Difficulty in securing funding is a constant challenge to the success of their campaigns. Further, the UN points out that they need mentors, mobilization and men (Chauvel, p.27). This means that without the support of their male counterparts, they have trouble winning the confidence of their people on a larger-scale. A woman named Hon. Shalini Tomar, who contested state assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh claims that education, self confidence and leadership skills will be crucial to bridge the gap (Lal).

While it is fine and good to speak about these concepts in an abstract and futuristic way, it is vital to discuss what impacts such movements could have on India in particular. Just as previously entailed when analyzing America, the same concepts of a woman's voice advocating for women's issues is relevant.

However, the stakes are arguably higher in India, a country where gender equality is simply a distant hope for many. To further postulate equality, one must look to the law. For instance, the Indian Constitution is laced with concepts of gender equality, yet this ideal is not upheld. Further, India has ratified various international conventions and other human rights methodologies such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women with only minor cultural shifts amongst the population (Lal). And so, one could argue that India has an unprecedented challenge to overcome with regard to gender inequality: its massive traditionally minded population.

With its 1.21 billion citizens in mind, it could be theorized that the law will have to be implemented and change will slowly follow. Thus, it is vital that the Women's Reservation Bill is enacted as soon as possible. Currently, it has been cleared by the Rajya Sabha (since 2010) but awaits approval from the Lok Sabha as well as Modi (Lal). Its passage would symbolize the most significant step towards political equality for women in India. This is crucial in a country where only 61 of 543 MPs in the lower house of Parliament are female (Lal).

Just as the U.S. is a critical model for equality due to its international reputation, India must set an example as well. The subcontinent is touted as the world's largest democracy, and this must stand for something. Further, it could enact real positive societal change with regards to issues like rape and female infanticide. Delhi-based sociologist Dr Patibha Pande was quoted to say, "...if a third of parliamentarians in India are women, a system of checks and balances will organically be kicked in to ensure enhanced vigilance from authorities in cases of rape and skewed sex ratio, which is rampant across the country" (Lal).

If she were right, this shift would certainly propel the nation in the right direction as its male superiority has many negative (and long-lasting) consequences. If women were in more positions of power in India, it is certain that campaigns like Modi's Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao Yojana would actually have a chance at succeeding. Slowly but surely, women would ensure that their girls got the same chance at education as their brothers. With literacy rates of only 54% compared to 76% of men, this is certainly something to aspire to (Lal).

In sum, under-representation in Parliamentary bodies is seemingly a global issue. While this paper focused on the United States and India, it goes without question that each and every nation must strive to increase their number of women in politics. Yet, it seems necessary for America and India to press on with this mission in full force. If we are to be superpowers and the champions of democracy that we both claim to be, then it is absolutely vital that we tap into the strength of half of our population. No longer can we afford to ignore the voice of women.

** Ms Kayla Douglas: is from State University of New York Sunny Cortland. She was a student of Foundation Course in Human Rights at St Aloysius College. This paper is written by her under the guidance of Dr Rose Veera D Souza, Dept of Political Science, St Aloysius College, Mangaluru.*

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